**Spring 2022 Starter Evidence Packet**

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Resolved: When in conflict, democracies should prioritize isolation over engagement when responding to human rights abuses by authoritarian regimes.

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# A Brief Topic Introduction

By Katie Humphries, CPFL Outreach Coordinator

As we all gear up for the spring semester, students should face no problems preparing for the CPFL spring topic area! Unlike the fall semester resolution, our current topic focuses on an international issue allowing for a vast expansion of different types of arguments, examples, and a plethora of more research - on top of the fact that the topic area itself is quite broad. There is no shortage of topic literature and research for this semester.

Diving in deeply to the topic, there are a few important key terms to note. First, the resolution juxtapositions two different approaches or solutions to human rights abuses by authoritarian regimes. This means that the logical structure for PRO teams is to defend isolation as the best strategy and CON teams to defend engagement as the best strategy. Furthermore, the resolution conditions the circumstances of isolation vs engagement through specifying three important terms:

* “Democracies” ensures that teams are discussing a.) actions via democratic states and b.) primarily unilateral responses (as opposed to actions via the UN, WTO or any other international agent)
* “Human rights abuses” requires teams specifically to work towards “solving” a specific issue, which means most arguments should be impacting out to some form of human rights abuses and much of the debate will be on the efficacy of these approaches in terms of how they help or harm human rights
* “Authoritarian regimes” mandates that debaters specifically defend isolation against authoritarian regimes or engagement with authoritarian regimes

These conditions should give context to what each debaters/teams burden is in the round. At it’s core, this resolution poses a question of mechanisms: which mechanism is the best to address human rights abuses?

What does “isolation” mean? Well, isolation likely encompasses a lot of things. The downside to this topic is that there aren’t 1,001 papers on “isolation vs engagement”, because most authors are writing on the specific types of isolation. Those types include sanctions and embargos - likely the largest area of the topic literature. This includes trade embargos, arms embargos, economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, and more. Diplomatic sanctions are a broad umbrella that likely include removing embassies, cutting off communication, ending various treaties, and more. On the other hand, “engagement” will definitely include various forms of intervention – either military, humanitarian, or via aid. Both sides (PRO and CON) should include arguments for their mechanism and against their opponent’s mechanism.

This starter evidence kit offers a thorough introduction to various literature on the resolution. PRO debaters can discuss the effectiveness of sanctions and embargos, while CON teams can argue that engagement strategies like foreign aid or humanitarian intervention are superior. I would encourage debaters to do a substantial amount of research on their own – this topic has an abundance of literature to dive into and explore!

# Background Information

## A history of economic sanctions

#### Noura Abughris n.d., Noura completed her Bachelors of Law (LLB) at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London (2017). “A Brief History of Economic Sanctions” Carter-Ruck https://www.carter-ruck.com/insight/a-brief-history-of-economic-sanctions/

**Economic sanctions are not a novel concept in international diplomacy.** In fact, they are rather ancient. The first recorded use of sanctions was in 432 BC, when the Athenian Empire banned traders from Megara from its marketplaces, thereby strangling the rival city state’s economy. **It was not however until the 20th century that the use of economic sanctions became more prominent. The League of Nations, and later the United Nations, played a key role in forging country-based sanctions in the early 20th century, often lazily imposing such measures on countries they wanted to pressure into complying with a specific foreign policy objective.** Country-based sanctions are a form of restrictive measure imposed by one country or entity on another with the aim of limiting the target country’s trade and business relations. **Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Vietnam are all countries that have had country-based sanctions imposed upon them.** The imposition of country-based sanctions can have a massive adverse effect on the economy and humanitarian wellbeing of the targeted country. As recognised by Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General to the United Nations in his 1997 report to the UN, country-based sanctions tend to inflict the most harm on vulnerable civilian groups and can cause great collateral damage to third states**. Widely shared concerns about the adverse impact of country-based sanctions led to the birth of “targeted” or “smart” sanctions in the early 21st century, following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States in 2001.** **Targeted sanctions aim to reduce collateral damage to the general population and third countries by targeting specific individuals or organisations believed to be responsible for offending behaviour.** Widely considered to be inspired by the Pinochet case and the Bosnian war crime trials, targeted sanctions were born out of a growing emphasis in international law on individual accountability of those in power for the unlawful acts of states. This development has arguably increased the effectiveness of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. However, concerns over their impact on human rights remain. **Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has questioned the legality of targeted UN sanctions and found them to be in breach of key procedural rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) e.g. the right to fair trial (Article 6 of the ECHR) and the right to an effective remedy** (Article 13 of the ECHR); see for example, the cases of Nada v. Switzerland (Application No. 10593/08, ECHR 2012) and Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc v. Switzerland (Application No. 5809/08). 48th session of the Human Rights Council At the 48th session of the Human Rights Council, on 16 September 2021, **Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for governments to reassess and critically re-evaluate their use of sanctions so as to avoid adverse impacts on human rights**. In her statement to the Human Rights Council, Ms Bachelet highlighted the severe impact that economic sanctions targeting an entire country or sector can have on the most vulnerable people in the country, who have “neither perpetrated crimes nor otherwise bear responsibility for improper conduct”. Ms Bachelet flagged that the lack of due process in imposing country-based sanctions enabled those “sought to be targeted” to “perversely benefit through gaming sanctions regimes” and profiteer “from the economic distortions and incentives introduced by them”. Ms Bachelet further explained that punitive restrictions on banks and financial institutions led to over-compliance which in some instances created obstacles to importing basic food and medical supplies and “risked causing more suffering and death and wider contagion around the world”. She added that “individuals and corporate entities subject to such sanctions often have scant legal process prior to being brought under such regimes, and frequently have little if any effective recourse to any mechanism to appeal liabilities or penalties that are applied against them”. It is no secret that economic sanctions are a powerful tool of foreign policy. **Governments seeking to influence a State’s behaviour in situations where diplomacy is insufficient and military intervention is deemed too risky (or otherwise unacceptable) regularly rely on economic sanctions to further their policy interests. Equally, it is no secret that economic sanctions can have and have had a direct and dire impact on the everyday lives and businesses of normal civilians.** The questioning of targeted sanctions’ legality and compliance with fundamental rights, combined with the fact that country-based sanctions remain in use, highlights that the adverse impacts of sanctions on basic human rights continues to be felt by many until this day. **As an increasing number of governments seek to increase and diversify the type of economic sanctions they impose, equal if not even more vigilant effort needs to be made in ensuring that the sanction regimes of restrictive measures enforced both secure respect for human rights and foster accountability.** In the words of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “human rights cannot be adequately protected – indeed they are profoundly undermined – if sanctions and the means of enforcement themselves violate them”.

## A history of foreign aid – from the US to international assistance to the IMF & World Bank as well as the literature/data surrounding foreign aid

#### Adam Klein and Benjamin Wittes 2020, Adam Klein chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board & Benjamin Wittes editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution,“The Long History of Coercive Health Responses in American Law”, 4/13/2020, Lawfare, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/long-history-coercive-health-responses-american-law>

**Foreign aid is controversial in development economics.** Three distinct camps may be distinguished: One believes that official assistance is ineffective, and has harmed poor countries throughout the years. This views official aid as creating dependency, fostering corruption, and encouraging currency overvaluation (Easterly 2014 and Moyo 2010). It also prevents countries from taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the global economy. Another camp believes that aid levels have been too low, and that large increases would help reduce poverty. This camp, however, believes we need a rethinking on the way in which aid is provided (Sachs 2009 and Stiglitz 2002). In particular, specific interventions, such as anti-malaria programmes, should be emphasised. The third camp is less vocal, and includes authors such as Collier (2007), who has emphasised the role of a number of ‘traps’ in perpetuating destitution, and Banerjee and Duflo (2011) who argue that the use of ‘randomised control trials’ may help devise effective and specific aid programmes in the war against poverty and underdevelopment.[1] These schools of thought have historical precedents. **Foreign aid policies from a historical perspective Foreign aid is a relatively new concept in economics.** The classics – Smith, Ricardo, and Stuart Mill, for example – didn’t address the subject in any significant way**. If anything, classical economists thought that the colonies would catch up – and even surpass – the home country quite rapidly**.[2] In Chapter VII of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith provides a detailed discussion on the “causes of the prosperity of the new colonies.”[3] **The first legal statute dealing expressly with official aid was passed by Parliament in the UK in 1929.[4] In 1940 and 1945, new laws dealing with aid to the colonies were passed in the UK. These Acts increased the amount of funds available, and made commitments for longer periods of time – for up to ten years in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945.** More important, the Act of 1945 established that aid plans had to be prepared “in consultation with representatives of the local population.”[5] **In the US the first law dealing with foreign assistance came quite late, with the adoption of the Marshall Plan in 1948.[6] In his inaugural speech on 20 January 1949 – the so-called ‘Four Point Speech’ – President Harry Truman put forward, for the first time, the idea that aid to poor nations was an important component of US foreign policy.** He said that one of the goals of his administration would be to foster “growth of underdeveloped areas.”[7] In spite of Truman’s vehement allocution, aid commitments to poor countries were considered temporary. **In 1953, when Congress extended the Mutual Security Act, it explicitly stated that economic aid to US allies would end in two years; military aid was to come to a halt in three years**. In the early 1960s – and largely as a result of the escalation of the Cold War – **the US revised its posture regarding bilateral assistance, and, jointly with other advanced countries, founded the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the newly formed Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).** The main objective of the DAC was – and continues to be – to coordinate aid to the poorest countries.[8] Foreign aid policies and academics’ views on development Academic research has helped shape international aid policies. **During the 1950s and 1960s, aid agencies’ work was influenced by the Harrod–Domar growth model and by W. Arthur Lewis’ unlimited supplies of labour model. As a result, most agencies funded very large capital-intensive projects, and neglected policies, projects, and programmes related to labour, human capital, and productivity.** This changed in the late 1960s and 1970s with the ascendance of Solow’s neoclassical model of growth, and the development of the ‘basic needs’ approach to welfare economics. Aid policies changed focus, and a higher percentage of funds were devoted to social programmes (health and education), programmes aimed at directly reducing poverty, and programmes that strengthened skills and human capital. Further changes in aid policy came with research that related openness and exports’ expansion to productivity growth. The work of Anne Krueger and Jagdish Bhagwati was particularly important. **During the 1980s and 1990s, international assistance became increasingly conditioned on the recipient countries liberalising their economies through the elimination of quantitative import restrictions and the lowering of import tariffs.** **The development of the ‘dependent economy’ macroeconomic model, with tradable and nontradable goods, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, helped put emphasis on the crucial role of the real exchange rate in the resource allocation process.** Works by Robert Mundell, Rudi Dornbusch, and others pointed out that real exchange rate overvaluation was costly and at the heart of devastating currency crises. These works, in conjunction with research undertaken by Robert Bates and Elliot Berg, among others, influenced aid agencies’ views regarding currencies, incentives, exports, and agriculture. The very poor performance of the agricultural sector between 1965 and 1985 in most regions – and in particular in Africa – also affected thinking in the aid agencies, and contributed to a new view that emphasised ‘getting prices right’. **In the 1990s, two research lines influenced aid policy. Work on incentive compatibility and strategic behaviour persuaded aid officials in donor countries to become more flexible, and to incorporate recipient governments in the design and management of aid programmes.** This approach received the name of ‘programme ownership’, and has been at the heart of improved relations between donors and poor nations in the last two decades. New research on capital mobility and the international transmission of crises, resulted in a more nuanced and pragmatic view regarding the use of capital controls. **Many agencies – including the IMF and the World Bank – supported a limited use of capital controls (especially controls on capital inflows) and so-called macro-prudential regulations, as a way of avoiding destabilising forces and currency crises.** Econometric studies Academic and aid-community economists have used a battery of econometric methods to analyse whether aid is effective in the sense of generating higher growth and better economic outcomes.[9] Some of these studies have tried to tackle issues of reverse causality, and have used a series of instruments – some more convincing than others – in an attempt to deal with the fact that slower growth (in very poor countries) may attract additional aid. Some research focused on whether aid only works under certain conditions, or whether a minimal degree of institutional development is required for international assistance to bear fruit (Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004). Many of these studies have considered nonlinear functional forms, and have investigated if there are meaningful interactions between aid and other variables, such as the degree of literacy, the level of corruption, the extent of macroeconomic stability, institutional strength, the quality of overall economic policies, and geography. In general, most studies have relied on cross-country or panel data, and have attempted to distinguish between short- and long-term impacts. A number of authors have used ‘Dutch disease’-related models to analyse the extent to which increased aid results in currency overvaluation, poor exports performance, and crises – see Rajan and Subramanian (2011). Fragile and inconclusive results Overall, the results from this large body of research have been fragile and inconclusive. **After analysing 97 studies, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008, 2009) concluded that, in the best of cases, it was possible to say that there was a small positive, and yet statistically insignificant, relationship between official aid and growth.** **This conclusion was also reached by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) in an analysis that corrected for potential endogeneity problems, and that considered a comprehensive number of covariates. In particular, according to this study there is no clear relation running from more aid to faster growth; this is true even in countries with better policy environment and stronger institutions – see also Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and Quibria (2014). Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) have argued that one should not be surprised by the inconclusiveness of studies that rely on aggregate data.** According to them, aid affects economic performance, directly and indirectly, through a variety of channels. Treating all aid as homogeneous – independently of whether it is emergency assistance, programme aid, or project-based aid – is misleading. In their view it is necessary to break open the ‘black box’ of international aid, and deconstruct the causality chain that goes, in intricate and non-obvious ways, from aid to policymakers, to policies, and to country outcomes. This type of analysis would explore a number of specific ways in which international assistance could impact economic performance**. In particular, according to Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) it is important that studies that try to determine the impact of aid on growth consider issues related to technical assistance, conditionality, level of understanding of the economy in question, and the government’s ability to implement specific policies.**[10] Bitter policy controversy In spite of its intensity, the academic debate pales in comparison with recent policy controversies on the subject. The level of animosity in this veritable war of ideas is illustrated by the following quote from an article by Jeffrey Sachs published in 2009: “Moyo's views [are] cruel and mistaken… [Moyo and Easterly are] trying to pull up the ladder for those still left behind.”[11] Easterly’s reply, also from 2009, was equally strong: “Jeffrey Sachs [is]… the world's leading apologist and fund-raiser for the aid establishment… Sachs suffers from [an]… acute shortage of truthiness…”[12] The Easterly–Sachs debate has generated public attention because it has been couched in rather simple terms. These are simple narratives based on ethnographic arguments that resonate with large segments of the general public. But behind the different positions there are hundreds of academic studies – most of them based on advanced econometric techniques – that have tried to determine the extent to which foreign aid is effective. The problem, as noted, is that much of this body of empirical work has resulted in fragile and inconclusive evidence. Intermediate positions For an increasing number of economists, the issue of aid effectiveness is neither black nor white. Indeed, a number of authors have taken intermediate positions. For example, in an influential book that deals with the plight of the poorest of the poor, **Collier (2009) has argued that both critics and staunch supporters of official aid have greatly exaggerated their claims and distorted the empirical and historical records. Collier’s reading of the evidence is that over the last 30 years official assistance has helped accelerate GDP growth among the poorest nations in the world – most of them in Africa – by approximately 1% per year.** This is a nontrivial figure, especially when one considers that during this period the poorest countries have had an aggregate rate of per capita growth of zero. That is, in the absence of official assistance, the billion people that live in these nations – the so-called ‘bottom billion’ – would have seen their incomes retrogress year after year. **Banerjee and Duflo (2011) argue that there is need for a “radical rethinking of the way to fight poverty.” In their view, the acrimonious debate between the Easterly and Sachs factions has missed the boat. Banerjee and Duflo join a growing group of researchers in arguing that this controversy cannot be solved in the abstract, by using aggregate data and cross-country regressions. The evidence, in their view, is quite simple – some projects financed by official aid work and are effective in reducing poverty and moving the domestic populations towards self-sufficiency and prosperity, while other projects (and programmes) fail miserably.** The question is not how aggregate aid programmes have fared in the past, but how to evaluate whether specific programmes are effective. **Persuasive ‘aid narratives’ In Edwards (2014b) I discuss the effectiveness-of-aid literature from a historical perspective, and I argue that international aid affects recipient economies in extremely complex ways and through multiple and changing channels. Moreover, this is a two-way relationship – aid agencies influence policies, and the reality in the recipient country affects the actions of aid agencies.** This relationship is so intricate and time-dependent that it is not amenable to being captured by cross-country or panel regressions; in fact, even sophisticated specifications with multiple breakpoints and nonlinearities are unlikely to explain the inner workings of the aid–performance connection**. Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) have pointed out that there is a need to go beyond econometrics, and to break open the ‘black box’ of development aid. I would go even further, and argue that we need to realise that there is a multiplicity of black boxes. Or, to put it differently, that the black box is highly elastic and keeps changing through time.** Breaking these boxes open and understanding why aid works some times and not others, and why some projects are successful while other are disasters, requires analysing in great detail specific country episodes. If we want to truly understand the convoluted ways in which official aid affects different economic outcomes, we need to plunge into archives, analyse data in detail, carefully look for counterfactuals, understand the temperament of the major players, and take into account historical circumstances. This is a difficult subject that requires detective-like work.

## Isolationism vs interventionism – a history and analysis

#### Robert W. Tucker 85, Robert W. Tucker, co-editor of The National Inter- est, is a professor at Johns Hopkins's School of Advanced International Studies and presi- dent of the Lehrman Institute, “Isolation & Intervention”, The National Interest , FALL 1985, No. 1 (FALL 1985), pp. 16-25, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42894372

**There are two fundamental and enduring dispositions in foreign policy: isolationism and interventionists** They rarely - if indeed, ever - appear in pure form. What inclination may prompt, circumstance and interest will nearly always qualify. In our own case, a concern to secure political isolation from Europe served as a principal justification for both a policy of territorial expansion in this continent and one of extending our influence over the entire hemi- sphere. Nineteenth century American isolation from Europe was the result of an almost uniquely benign set of circumstances. **A detached and distant position and a favorable balance of power in Europe not only made that status viable but virtually ensured its success. No serious adventure could be undertaken in the Western Hemisphere by a continental power without the assistance or, at the very least, the acquiescence of Great Britain. Despite an occasional lapse, Britain found it generally in her interest to discourage such adventures by others. These circumstances apart, hemispheric isolation also expressed the evident interests of the nation and reflected the limited power at our disposal. Not only had we no plausible interest to intervene in European politics, we did not have the means of doing so**. It is only between the two world wars that we acquired the interest and power to do what policy and tradition rejected. In consequence, it is only between the wars that we went from a status of being isolated to a policy of being isolationist. Robert W. Tucker, co-editor of The National Inter- est, is a professor at Johns Hopkins's School of Advanced International Studies and president of the Lehrman Institute. Given our interwar experience, the stigma that has since attached to isolationism is understandable. Even so, the stigma and the judgment it reflects have become a prejudice. Many no longer even know what isolationism means; they only know it is a label to be avoided. Since the 1970s, isolationist views have been frequently paraded as a "new internationalism," presumably to differentiate them from the "old internationalism" that had led to Vietnam. Whereas the old internationalism of the cold war was interventionist, the new international- ism is anti-interventionist. This terminology, a complete reversal of conventional usage, reflects a determination not to be marked by the dread epithet. 1 There need be no mystery about the meaning of isolationism as a policy. It means today what it meant yesterday. **An isolationist policy is one of general political detachment. It avoids entering into certain relationships, notably alliances, and undertaking certain actions, notably military interventions.** **Historically, our policy of isolation was defined primarily by our political detachment from Europe, then the center of the state system. At present, a policy of isolation is most reasonably defined by reference to the set of relations that have been critical in determining our post-war position of primacy in the world.** It is our alliance relations with Western Europe and Japan that provide the litmus test. Those who support our major alliances, and accept all that this support must imply, cannot be considered as isolationist how- ever much they may oppose intervention else- where. Isolationism is not like pregnancy; a little of it is quite possible as long as it does not substantially affect the central balance of power in the world. The conviction that we must be either isolationist or interventionist, committed virtually everywhere or nowhere, reflects an absolutism that has prompted us in the past to excesses in policy and may do so again if we fail to disenthrall ourselves from it. ISOLATIONISM has often been equated with indifference. The equation may be quite misleading when applied to a small or even a middle power. Even in the case of a great power it may neglect other motivations. **In our own case, a deep and pervasive fear of the domestic effects of intervening in European politics persisted until World War II. In part, this fear resulted from America's ethnic composition. Europe's conflicts divided us and placed American nationality under considerable strain. In part, too, there was an almost obsessive fear that foreign involvement - and above all war - must erode constitutional processes and betray the American do- mestic promise. Isolationists entertained widely divergent visions of that promise. Yet it was the same conviction about the threatening domestic effects of foreign involvement that in the 1930s could unite such otherwise different figures as the socialist Norman Thomas and the conservative Robert A. Taft. The isolationist disposition is also rooted in the commitment to unilateralism.** The importance attached to retaining complete independence of action in foreign policy requires no special explanation. To be able to separate one's fate from the fate of others is always desirable, though rarely possible. The isolationist disposition responds to the deep-rooted desire to have complete control over one's destiny. That desire is apparent today and it has taken more than one expression. These considerations qualify the equation of isolationism with indifference, particularly when applied to a great power. They do not refute that charge. For the mark of great power is that, by virtue of the resources at its disposal, it can affect the fate of others. If it refuses to do so, this must at least in part be traced to indifference. **Interventionism, by contrast, is equated with concern. This does not somehow make it politically or morally preferable to isolationism. To find in isolationism a sin of the spirit because it denotes indifference is no more persuasive than to see in interventionism a virtue because it denotes concern. Interventionism does not have a set of uniform consequences. There have been all kind and manner of interventionists in history. What can be said of all interventionists - the successful and the unsuccessful, the just and the unjust - is that they have sought to impose their will on a recalcitrant world.** **Great powers have been especially inclined to change the world and they have never lacked reasons for doing so. In the case of revolutionary great powers, this disposition is often transformed into an obsession to recreate the world and not merely to change it.** Men and nations being what they are, the world is difficult to change, let alone to recreate. The means of those who desire to change the world need not always involve force, but they normally have done so. In our own history, the nation's mission of regenerating the world by bringing to it the blessings of freedom was for long to be implemented through the power of moral example. This is why, as Louis Hartz long ago pointed out, we have always been able to see ourselves as regenerating the world while remaining politically withdrawn - that is, iso- lated - from it. Of course, in this hemisphere we were often neither withdrawn nor particu- larly regenerative. Elsewhere, however, this distinctly American disposition persisted until well into this century. Long after it was given up, at the time of the war in Vietnam, the plea was made by many lapsed interventionists to restore it, the argument being that we might once again do by the power of example what we could no longer do by the power of our arms.

# Pro Evidence

## Empirically, military aid results in more repressive regimes

Sullivan Et Al. 20 [Patricia L. Sullivan Department of Public Policy University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Leo J. Blanken Defense Analysis Department Naval Postgraduate School, Ian C. Rice Defense Analysis Department Naval Postgraduate School, 2020, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries”, Defense and Peace Economics, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388

**This study sought to evaluate how military aid and arms transfers to post-conflict countries affect the human rights practices of recipient regimes. We argued that significant flows of lethal capacity from foreign governments could encourage a regime to adopt a more restrictive repressive approach to governance by: (1) increasing the state’s capacity and lowering its cost for repression, and (2) strengthening the security sector relative to other state institutions.** To overcome significant data limitations and endogeneity concerns we created a novel measure of military aid from event data and adopted an instrumental variable for arms transfers to postconflict countries. **The results of our empirical analyses provide strong evidence that governments become more repressive when they receive military aid or major conventional weapons transfers in the decade after conflict termination. In stark contrast, we find that levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) are positively correlated with human rights conditions in post-conflict countries.** We began our paper with a puzzle generated by American lethal aid transfers to South Korea and El Salvador. We now return to the implications of our study for U.S. foreign policy as building partner forces in conflict-affected regions has become a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy over the last decade. In FY2017, the United States allocated over $20 billion dollars for security assistance to foreign governments. Between 2001 and 2017, U.S. aid to the military and police in foreign countries totaled over $291 billion.xiii Since the late 1990s, the Leahy Amendments have conditioned the provision of lethal aid to military units deemed to have engaged in gross human rights violations (Serafino et al. 2014). These congressional acts represent important steps forward in mandating oversight for the deleterious impact that U.S. lethal aid may have in fragile states. As U.S. security assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan shows, however, monitoring the human rights impact of U.S. assistance is an enduring challenge. In both countries, critics have raised concerns about extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and high rates of civilian casualties in operations by military units trained, equipped, and advised by the American military.xiv At the same time, these units are typically the most capable components of otherwise weak national security forces and there is anecdotal evidence that concerted training, monitoring, and oversight efforts have reduced abuses by units receiving U.S. security force assistance (Watts et al. 2018). Iraqi counter-terrorism (CT) units, for example, once implicated in human rights abuses and sectarian targeting (Witty 2015), have rehabilitated their image, arguably as a result of having “received concentrated and continuous training… [in which] American trainers put a special emphasis on human rights in an effort to keep the force beyond reproach.” xv The primary contribution of this study is substantial new evidence on systematic trends in the relationship between foreign security assistance and human rights conditions in post-conflict countries. There is far more work to be done in the context of larger research agendas on the human security impacts of military aid and the determinants of the quality of the peace in post conflict countries. Additional research is needed, for example, to determine whether conditioning aid on good governance or greater emphasis on security sector reforms can effectively counteract the general tendency of states to use enhanced repressive capacity against the civilian population. **Nevertheless, these results hold important implications for major arms and aid providers, particularly as the international community is confronted with a growing number of countries emerging from devastating internal conflicts. The data we use from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that between 1950 and 2015 the average post-conflict country received major conventional weapons valued at almost $237 million dollars**xvi **in the decade after conflict termination. Governments should be mindful of the risk that arming and equipping security forces in fragile states could encourage the government to rely on repression as a response to dissent and make state repression more deadly. Particular caution is warranted when transferring the types of weapons that are most likely to be used against internal threats to a regime in the wake of internal armed conflicts.**

## Military training assistance results in an increase in coups

Savage & Caverley 17, Jesse Dillon Savage Department of Political Science Trinity College, Jonathan D Caverley Strategic and operational Research College of Naval Warfare Studies, 7/13/17, “When human capital threatens the Capitol: Foreign aid in the form of military training and coups”, Journal of Peace Research, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343317713557>

**The effect on domestic politics of assistance in the form of foreign military training (FMT) is unlikely to be limited to respect for human rights and civilian control.** Training imparts valuable resources to and increases the professional distance of a potentially dangerous section of a developing state’s polity. **Increasing trainees’ human capital is likely to increase resource demands on the regime, and improve the military’s ability to remove the regime should its demands not be met. We find a robust relationship between US training of foreign militaries and military-backed coup attempts, despite limiting our analysis to the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), which explicitly focuses on promoting norms of civilian control. If the number of soldiers trained (or dollars spent) moves from the 25th percentile to the 75th, the predicted probability of a coup roughly doubles. We also find that FMT correlates to the likelihood of a successful military-backed coup.** **That training is positively associated with coups even when analysis is limited to democracies represents an especially profound challenge to the idea that the only political effect of training is to fundamentally alter militaries’ norms.** Lack of evidence linking training and non-military-backed coups further undermines this mechanism. Finally, training’s effect on coup propensity differs significantly from other forms of military aid in both direction and magnitude, lending support to our theoretical argument about the non-fungibility of military human capital. Coups are extreme examples of military involvement in domestic politics. Our theory suggests more generally that trained military officers will grow more autonomous from the regime. This can increase inclination for coups but more broadly means that the military will be less invested in regime survival (Atkinson, 2006, 2010; Brooks, 2013). Providing the military with resources that are not vulnerable to redistribution may mean they are less inclined to repress to prevent regime change in general. In this case, normative and capital-based mechanisms make similar claims, and may reinforce each other.

## Military bases and troops fuel terror

David Vine 17, PhD and MA, Anthropology, Graduate Center, City University of New York “Think Donald Trump is too cozy with dictators? Check out the US Military”, May 25, 2017 , Business Standard, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/think-donald-trump-is-too-cozy-with-dictators-check-out-the-us-military-117052500330\_1.html

Blowback While some defend the presence of bases in undemocratic countries as necessary to deter “bad actors” and support “U.S. interests” (primarily corporate ones), **backing dictators and autocrats frequently leads to harm not just for the citizens of host nations but for U.S. citizens as well. The base build-up in the Middle East has proven the most prominent example of this.** Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, which both unfolded in 1979, the Pentagon has built up scores of bases across the Middle East at a cost of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. **According to former West Point professor Bradley Bowman, such bases and the troops that go with them have been a “major catalyst for anti-Americanism and radicalization.” Research has similarly revealed a correlation between the bases and al-Qaeda recruitment**. **Most catastrophically, outposts in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan have helped generate and fuel the radical militancy that has spread throughout the Greater Middle East and led to terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States.** **The presence of such bases and troops in Muslim holy lands was, after all, a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s professed motivation for the 9/11 attacks.** With the Trump administration seeking to entrench its renewed base presence in the Philippines and the president commending Duterte and similarly authoritarian leaders in Bahrain and Egypt, Turkey and Thailand, **human rights violations are likely to escalate, fueling unknown brutality and baseworld blowback for years to come.**

## Military based interventions shift the balance of power between conflict actors, increasing violence

Reed et. Al 12, Reed M Wood of School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University Jacob D Kathman of Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, SUNY Stephen £ Gent of Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill “Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts”, September 2012, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 647-660http://www.jstor.org/stable/41721630

Research has begun to examine the relationship between changes in the conflict environment and levels of civilian victimization. We extend this work by examining the effect of external armed intervention on the decisions of governments and insurgent organizations to victimize civilians during civil wars. **We theorize that changes in the balance of power in an intrastate conflict influence combatant strategies of violence.** **As a conflict actor weakens relative to its adversary, it employs increasingly violent tactics toward the civilian population as a means of reshaping the strategic landscape to its benefit. The reason for this is twofold.** **First, declining capabilities increase resource needs at the moment that extractive capacity is in decline. Second, declining capabilities inhibit control and policing, making less violent means of defection deterrence more difficult**. As both resource extraction difficulties and internal threats increase, actors' incentives for violence against the population increase. **To the extent that biased military interventions shift the balance of power between conflict actors, we argue that they alter actor incentives to victimize civilians.** Specifically, intervention should reduce the level of violence employed by the supported faction and increase the level employed by the opposed faction. We test these arguments using data on civilian casualties and armed intervention in intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2005. **Our results support our expectations, suggesting that interventions shift the power balance and affect the levels of violence employed by combatants.**

## Foreign aid causes aid shocks that incite violence

Nielsen et. Al 11, Richard A. Nielsen Harvard University Michael G. Findley Brigham Young University Zachary S. Davis Brigham Young University Tara Candland Brigham Young University Daniel L. Nielson Brigham Young University “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict”, 2011, American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 219–232, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00492.x

In this study we resolve part of the confusion over how foreign aid affects armed conflict. **We argue that aid shocks—severe decreases in aid revenues—inadvertently shift the domestic balance of power and potentially induce violence. During aid shocks, potential rebels gain bargaining strength vis-a-vis the government. To appease the rebels, the government must ` promise future resource transfers, but the government has no incentive to continue its promised transfers if the aid shock proves to be temporary.** **With the government unable to credibly commit to future resource transfers, violence breaks out.** Using AidData’s comprehensive dataset of bilateral and multilateral aid from 1981 to 2005, we evaluate the effects of foreign aid on violent armed conflict. In addition to rare-event logit analysis, we employ matching methods to account for the possibility that aid donors anticipate conflict. **The results show that negative aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onset.**

## Aid used for political interventions creates dependency that harms governance long term and delays political reform

Victoria Stanford 15, University of Edinburgh, “Aid Dependency: The Damage of Donation”, July 31 2015, https://www.twigh.org/twigh-blog-archives/2015/7/31/aid-dependency-the-damage-of-donation

How has aid caused dependency? **Aid dependency refers to the proportion of government spending that is given by foreign donors.** Since 2000 this has in fact decreased by one third in the world’s poorest countries, **exemplified by Ghana and Mozambique where aid dependency decreased from 47% to 27% and 74% to 58% respectively** (3). Aid is not intrinsically linked to dependency; studies have shown that dependency is influenced by many factors, mostly length and intensity of the donation period, and 15-20% has been identified as the tipping point where aid begins to have negative effects (Clemens et al., 2012). **What causes dependency is when aid is used, intentionally or not, as a long-term strategy that consequently inhibits development, progress, or reform.** Food aid is particularly criticised for this; increasing dependency on aid imports disincentivises local food production by reducing market demand. This is compounded when declining aid is replaced with commercial imports rather than locally-sourced food, either because of cheaper prices or a lack of recipient country food production capacity because of long-term aid causing agricultural stagnation (Shah, 2012). This is exemplified in the situation of Haiti, which is dependent on cheap US imports for over 80% of grain stocks even in a post-aid era, or countries such as the Philippines where aid dependency has forced an over-reliance on cash crops. Dependency relates not only to commodities but also technical expertise and skills which donors often bring to specific aid schemes and projects, which when not appropriately coupled with education create an over-reliance on donors (Thomas et al., 2011). A more concerning type of dependency **The nature of aid almost intrinsically causes what is increasingly known as ‘political dependency’ by encouraging donor intervention in political processes.** **Donors need to satisfy the interests, values and incentives of the home country, whilst also providing them with expected results in order to maintain the cash flow. This has resulted in donors either bypassing and therefore destabilising government service provision processes to establish donor projects**, a strategy often favoured by USAID and the World Bank (Bräuntigam and Knack, 2004), or intervening directly in policy-making and implementation (Bräutigam, 2000). **The involvement of donors, either foreign governments or international agencies, in recipient country political processes has been shown to reduce the quality of governance** (Knack, 2001). It reduces leader accountability; the government is “playing to two audiences simultaneously”- the donors and the public (Hayman, 2008). **This means the direction of accountability is between government and donor rather than the public, risking government legitimacy and delaying the progress of political reform and development** (Bräutigam, 2000). **This is particularly damaging in countries where the need for aid stems from political upheaval or civil unrest such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Zimbabwe, which have a lengthy history of aid dependence** (Moss et al., 2006). **The risk here is that donors have political leverage, thus decisions and planning become reliant on donor involvement whose motivation and values may not necessarily align with those of the public or government.** Furthermore, ‘earmarking’ is a strategy favoured by many international donors who fear corruption in recipient governments, therefore ‘earmark’ direct sector or programme funding rather than general government budget support (Foster and Leavy, 2001). **This not only shifts the agenda-making power to donors who have the authority to set priorities and direct funds accordingly, but also creates patchy and unsustainable development where some sectors outperform others.** An additional significant problem of dependency upon international agenda-making for countries receiving aid is that globally recommended ‘best practice’ policies often lack appropriate contextualisation to cultural, religious, or social values. **A top-down, uniform approach to policy implementation by donors also has logistical barriers whereby local infrastructure is incapable of carrying out donor projects effectively and producing satisfactory results.** A good example of this is the widely-disseminated policy encouraging syndromic management of sexually transmitted diseases, which was coercively incorporated into aid channels in Mozambique, despite the clear lack of the technical expertise and human resource capacity that such a robust policy requires (Cliff et al., 2004). **This then perpetuates aid dependency because donors do not receive satisfactory project results and may consequently reduce funding without actually solving the problem, thus the poverty cycle continues and aid is required once again.**

## Engagement with totalitarians fails - only empowers them to crack down

Jeff Jacoby 14, Columnist for The Boston Globe, “Lift the Embargo – But liberate Cuba First”, The Boston Globe, 6/25/2014, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/06/24/lift-embargo-but-liberate-cuba-first/7Msp22F4gTVhBajSG8lSaK/story.html>

Yet the focus on polling data is a distraction. The US economic embargo is not the cause of Cuba’s misery. The Castro tyranny is. **Unilaterally repealing the embargo would not weaken that tyranny by flooding the island with American tourists, consumer goods, and democratic notions**, as sanctions opponents romantically imagine. **Nearly 3 million tourists already visit Cuba annually, hundreds of thousands of Americans among them. In recent years, more tourists have traveled to Cuba from the United States than from any other country except Canada. The trade embargo is far from hermetic. Since 2000, US exporters have sold close to $5 billion in food, agricultural, and medical goods to Cuba — for several years, in fact, the United States was Cuba’s fifth-largest trade partner.** Meanwhile, Cuba has had the rest of the world to do business with, unfettered by embargoes or Florida politics. If tourism and trade were going to undermine Cuba’s communist regime, it would surely have toppled long ago. But **engagement with totalitarians doesn’t turn them into free and democratic neighbors. Rather, it empowers them to crack down on their subjects with even greater impunity.** **According to Elizardo Sanchez, a well-known human rights activist in Havana, detentions of dissidents have spiked, reaching more than 3,800 in just the first four months of 2014, far above the previous high of 2,795 two years ago.** The embargo, or what remains of it, is not chiseled in granite. It is, however, codified in US law. The Helms-Burton Act, signed by Hillary Clinton’s husband in 1996, allows the embargo to be lifted once the Cuban government legalizes political opposition, frees its political prisoners, and schedules democratic elections. Cuban dissidents insist on that point at the risk of going to prison. Shouldn’t American politicians, with nothing at risk but their credibility, insist on it as well?

## The majority of arms embargoes have had notable effects on import patterns and can affect policy

Michael Brzoska 18, Columnist for The Boston Globe, “Measuring the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes”, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Volume 14, Issue 2 2008 Article 2, doi:10.2202/1554-8597.1118

**The analysis of a sample of 74 arms embargo cases yields some interesting results**. **Among the most important results are that arms embargoes have had, on average, notable effects on arms import patterns.** While no arms embargo has had 100% effectiveness, **the majority has induced at least some change in arms import patterns, with many having some or even significant effects.** This fact tends to get lost in many case studies of arms embargoes, where a very high standard of success is set, usually the total end of imports of arms and ammunition. However, changes in arms import patterns, whether major or minor, have had, on average, rather little effect on targeted policies. Targets have continued to pursue policies which senders wanted to end, or they changed policies for reasons other than external manipulation of arms flows. Obviously, the link between arms supplies and policy changes in the target is weak. Targets adapt their military forces and styles of war to the level of arms and ammunition available. Arms embargoes often come very late in the game. **A more timely reaction might increase the likelihood that sanctions have some effect on policy change. The data analysis confirms that the effects of arms embargoes on target policies increase over time. The success rates of long-running arms embargoes are significantly higher than those of short-lived ones. Arms embargoes take time to have effects on policy change. As stocks of arms and ammunition are depleted, concerns over decreases in firepower grow and with them, at least in a number of cases, the willingness to change policies.** The data also confirm the hypothesis that multilateral arms embargoes are more successful than unilateral ones. **Multilateralization increases the supplier’s satisfaction with an embargo, raises the likelihood of significant changes in arms import patterns, and even increases the chance of policy change in the target.** Related to the multilateralization is arms embargo implementation. A higher degree of participation of countries and a stronger effort at implementation by participants increase the effectiveness of arms embargoes with respect to arms imports by the target. **Arms embargo implementation has improved over time, at least with respect to the change of arms import patterns.** Senders have become smarter in terms of multilateralization of arms embargoes and improving implementation. However, there has not been a corresponding improvement in the success rate of targeted policy change. Finally the success of arms embargoes remains limited when policy change is the ultimate objective. Senders can reduce and stop arms flows, but they have little power over policy change in the target. However, policy change is not the only goal senders pursue when adopting sanctions. **Multilateralization of national restrictions and success in significantly changing arms import patterns also seem to be valued by sanction initiators.** **Arms embargoes are comparatively cheap for senders, and thus even partially enforced embargoes may be efficient**. They are signals of disapproval in particular for countries with restrictive arms export policies. Not much can be pulled from the analysis presented here for the question why targets do not react to decreases in arms flows. It seems that neither the importance of a particular policy to a target, nor countermeasures nor decision-making structure in the target can explain much of the variance in the rate of success in influencing target policies. In combination, all these factors have some effect, even if not very strong. **Arms embargoes are clearly more effective when they are consistently embedded in other measures.** In fact, this may be the most important policy lesson from this study: arms embargoes in and of themselves will seldom affect target policies. They are instead most effective when utilized as a consistent element of larger policy packages. In addition, there need to be a long time period allotted for the implementation in order to increase the possibilities of success. Arms embargoes have very seldom had effects on targeted policies prior to their fifth year of implementation. The analysis indicates that several factors may be responsible for the arms embargo paradox. **Arms embargoes are somewhat more effective, at least with respect to arms flows, if measures of success are allowed to fluctuate between no effect and full attainment of the social objective.** However, they are not a strong instrument to change incriminated policies. In summary, no single explanation gets strong support, but all seem to contribute.

## Sanctions positively protect human rights and can strengthen international human rights laws by developing global norms

Buhm Suk Baek 08, J.S.D. candidate, Cornell Law School, “Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations”, Cornell Law Library, 4/14/2008, https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=lps\_clacp

The idea of human rights protection, historically, has been considered as a domestic matter, to be realized by individual states within their domestic law and national institutions. **The protection and promotion of human rights, however, have become one of the most important issues for the international community as a whole. Yet, with time, it has become increasingly difficult for the international community to address human rights problems collectively.** Despite a significant development in the human rights norms, effective protection of fundamental human rights and their legal enforcement has a long way to go. **This paper will argue that economic sanctions can contribute to a decrease in individual states’ human rights violations and can be an effective enforcement tool for international law. The international community, including the U.N., should impose effective economic sanctions against states where gross human rights violators are.** **Economic sanctions have been widely used by the U.N. since the end of the Cold War. Their purpose is generally not to punish the individual state but to modify its behavior.** However, such sanctions conflict with other fundamental principles of international law, namely the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty. Economic sanctions can also conflict with the WTO’s first agenda: free trade. Even worse, economic sanctions are criticized because these sanctions are, arguably, targeted at the people at large, not to the regime, a violator of international norms. This paper will review the role of economic sanctions in international human rights law. Chapter II examines the principle of non-intervention and whether its exceptions are in international human rights law. Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic sanctions for human rights protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. Chapter IV examines the legality of the economic sanctions against human rights violations under the WTO system and reviews the possibility of the harmonization of international economic law with international human rights law. Lastly, Chapter V concludes by emphasizing the importance of economic sanctions against human rights violations. Based on the research outlined above, this paper concludes as follows: Chapter II maintains that **the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty should and can be complementary**. **The protection and promotion of human rights can be enhanced with a respect for state sovereignty. In other words, each individual state has a responsibility to protect and promote the human rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of sovereignty.** State sovereignty and independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a guarantee for the realization of the fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. Chapter II also concludes that the concept of human rights has been expanded and the core human rights are inalienable and legally enforceable ones. The evolvement of international human rights law is one of the most remarkable innovations in modern international law. **If gross human rights violations, especially those established by the status of Jus Cogens or obligations Erga Omnes, are not solved by a state itself, it is no longer solely the problem of the state concerned.** Fundamental human rights have acquired a status of universality and the international community should accept this. Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic sanctions for human rights protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. **All cases of economic sanctions against gross human rights violations discussed, ten by the Security Council, five by the U.S. and seven by the E.U., were provided as samples to illustrate the idea that economic sanctions by the international community as a whole bolster fundamental human rights.** **This paper concludes that the sanctions by the Security Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have at least some positive effects on international human rights law.** **They build international human rights norms. This development also leads to the growing willingness of the international community to impose economic sanctions for human rights protection.** Undeniably, economic sanctions have had some negative effects on the targeted states. In numerous reports and articles, scholars and human rights advocates have constantly argued that economic sanctions hurt large numbers of innocent civilians in the targeted states. Economic sanctions, however, cannot be the sole cause of civilian suffering in the targeted states. The targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for this suffering. It is undeniable that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. But, this paper disagrees with arguments for opposing the use of economic sanctions because of such flaws and negative effects. **The problem is not in the sanctions themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic sanctions should focus on finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than arguing for not imposing them without providing a better alternative.** **Overall, this chapter concludes that economic sanctions have become part of a collective effort by the international community to develop current human rights norms and to protect and promote fundamental human rights in the targeted states.** Chapter IV concludes that while economic sanctions are inherently against the free trade provisions of the GATT, economic sanctions against gross human rights violations are allowed under the exceptional provisions of the GATT in the WTO system. This paper also argues that the GATT should be interpreted consistently with international law. That is, trade restriction measures against gross human rights violations are compatible with the GATT. As discussed in Chapter II and III, fundamental human rights violations are no longer just the domestic concern of each individual state. The evolvement of international human rights law demonstrates that, first, international human rights norms recognized as Jus Cogens provide the legality for the international community’s intervention in offending states; and second, the Erga Omnes status of international human rights norms shows that every state has an interest in other states observing these human rights norms. Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the main goal of the WTO, i.e. free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not undermine the WTO system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade framework under international law. Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been a significant evolution toward the universality of human rights. However, international legal enforcement systems for human rights norms are still underdeveloped despite the considerable progress in international human rights law. **This paper concludes that economic sanctions can contribute to a decrease in individual states’ human rights violations and can be an effective enforcement tool for international law.**

## Besides military force, economic sanctions are the only major tool leaders have to end human rights abuses – and they work

George Lopez 13, Law, University of Notre Dame, “Enforcing Human Rights Through Economic Sanctions”, The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, October 2013, DOI: 10.1093/law/9780199640133.003.0033

**Short of military force, economic sanctions are the only major tool available to national leaders and multilateral institutions that will produce results essential to ending harsh repression and human rights abuses. By blocking access to financial assets, sanctions— sometimes slowly, but always surely—erode the regime’s ability to purchase arms and mercenaries from abroad. Sanctions constrain guarantees that dictators can make to supporters that their government will meet the payroll. Monetary and travel sanctions placed on a growing number of government and military officials run a strong probability of sparking defections among the ruling elite. The continued fragility of human rights in nations emerging from internal war or economic crisis combines with the horrific mass atrocities of recent decades, to increase the likelihood that national policy-makers will turn to sanctions continually as a tool for coercion and persuasion.** The emergence of the principles of protecting civilians and the responsibility to protect bolsters this prospect. Yet, the track record of the UN and the international community in addressing atrocities—as in the different responses to Libya and Syria, which occurred just one year apart—makes clear the complexity related to the problems and the challenges of mounting a fully successful action. It is a bitter irony that the quick success of the combination of coercive measures to protect the lives and rights of Libyans, in which NATO may have overstepped its military mandate, has led to big power disagreements over the application of the same principle and tools in Syria.76 **The recent successes of sanctions in Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia can be extended to other areas, if analysts dig deeper into the workings of repression and discover the revenue that the commodities supporting mass violence and the myriad enablers to human rights violations and mass atrocities generate.** Targeting the diversity of these non-state actors early in an internal war, or as early warning signs of atrocities emerge, can increase the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool for human rights protection.

## Diplomatic sanctions can achieve policy goals without being overly intrusive or harmful

Chloe Chibeau 20, Pardee School of Global Studies,“Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Case Studies on the Former Yugoslavia and Present Day Russia”, April 1, 2020, https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2020/11/Chloe-Chibeau-Honors-Thesis.pdf

The first policy option to consider is no future use of economic sanctions. According to a study done by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium, out of the three most common uses of sanctions, the most effective are constraint, effective in 28% of UN targeted sanctions episodes with mixed efficacy in 22%, and signaling, effective in 27% of sanctions episodes with mixed efficacy in 44%. Coercion, the third determined objective of sanctions, was effective only 10% of the time with mixed efficacy in 27%. 68 **The most successful aspects of sanctions are the ability to signal consequences for violating international norms, to stigmatize and isolate a target who is violating norms, and to constrain targets access to resources.** **These aspects can be achieved through other less invasive methods than economic sanctions. Less invasive options include diplomatic sanctions such as revocation of visas, closing of embassies, or limiting diplomatic personnel, individual travel bans, and in cases of armed conflict, arms embargoes.** **A positive of this option is that it limits the effect on anyone but government officials. The cost of comprehensive economic sanctions is borne by civilians. This has proven not to be effective in eliciting change in political opinion and inspiring political revolt. Instead, citizens who faced difficulties were more likely to be vulnerable to propaganda produced by their government. It is unlikely that citizens will be harmed as a direct result of diplomatic sanctions as there would be no economic constriction or shortage of goods.** In combination with the decreased humanitarian effect, any long term psychological effects on citizens and their society would be minimized as well. The pessimism and hopelessness attributed to the dehumanizing effects of a society under economic sanctions would be avoided.

## Diplomatic sanctions are precise and targeted policies that can coerce behavioral changes

David S. Koller and Miriam Eckenfels-Garcia 15, “USING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO END VIOLATIONS AGAINST CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT”, BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 33:1, 1/14/2015, https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r33548.pdf

3. Asset Freezes, Financial Restrictions, and Travel Bans **The most narrowly tailored measures available to the Security Council target specific individuals, groups, or entities by freezing their assets, restricting financial transfers, and placing travel bans**. The Security Council (through the sanctions committees) typically identifies the individuals, groups, or entities to subject to such measures, **but it also may impose blanket bans on the export of certain goods presenting particular value to the target.** For example, the Security Council imposed a ban on the export of luxury goods from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 1 3 5 **Asset freezing and travel bans on specific individuals are particularly effective in influencing political elites through personal inconvenience and tarnishing their reputation in the international community.**136 **Travel bans, when enforceable, may also prove useful where individuals and armed groups operate across borders or receive safe haven in neighboring countries.**137 **Asset freezes and restrictions on financial transfers can likewise be used to cut off outside support from regional actors or diaspora, limiting an armed group's ability to carry out operations during conflict. Variations of these measures include diplomatic sanctions, such as the withdrawal of accreditation or suspension from international or regional organizations.**138 Model Security Council resolutions on financial transaction sanctions and travel and aviation bans, such as those developed, respectively, as part of Switzerland's "Interlaken Process",139 and Germany's "Bonn-Berlin Process,"140 both convened jointly with the UN Secretariat, provide further guidance on such measures. **These increasingly precise measures may have a significant impact while minimizing harm to innocent populations.**1 4 ' **They can be used both to coerce behavioral changes by offering rewards or directly punishing the leaders of armed forces and to constrain uncooperative groups' behavior by targeting third party supporters** who may be eager to avoid Security Council interference in their activities.14 However, as discussed below, not all armed forces or groups will necessarily react the same way to the threat of individualized measures, and the effective implementation of such complex measures poses significant challenges.

## Sanctions are empirically effective at reducing conflicts

Escribà-Folch 08*,* Abel Escribà-Folch Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, “ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE DURATION OF CIVIL CONFLICTS”, 2008, <https://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/47934/escriba_jpeares_econo.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Studies of the efficacy of economic sanctions have tended to analyze it in a rather general way and using constructed variables that often assess the success of a sanction episode on an ordinal scale. In this work I sought to explore the effect of sanctions in a very specific context, civil war duration, using a time-series crosssectional dataset and a direct measure of event occurrence, civil war termination and outcome. **I hypothesized that sanctions would have a significant negative effect on intrastate conflict duration, mainly due to three basic mechanisms: convergence of parties’ beliefs over power, reduced utility of victory and financial pressure that reduce parties’ viability of continued fighting.** Our second proposition contended that those sanctions maximizing the costs to the target would be more effective than other types of targeted measures in bringing war to and end. Finally, I further proposed that those sanctions imposed by an international institution would be more effective in augmenting the probability of intrastate conflict termination. **Our empirical evidence using new data on sanctions shows that, effectively, sanctions have had a significant and negative impact on intrastate conflict duration. Moreover, this effect augments the more the years a given country is targeted. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variable controlling for external military interventions. Moreover, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that the most successful measures so far have been total economic embargoes. Such measures are shown to increase the likelihood of both a military victory and a negotiated settlement, while international arms embargos are only found to significantly decrease the likelihood of a military victory by one the parties.** Regarding the debate about the efficacy of sanctions imposed by international institutions or not, this article has shed light on the distinctive effect of both types of sanction. Although the coefficients for sanctions backed by international institutions and those which are not are extremely similar in size in the general models of war duration, I find that sanctions imposed by international institutions significantly increase the likelihood of conflict resolution, especially if the targeted country is a member of the 20 organization. In contrast, sanctions applied by other bodies are much more conducive to military victories. In sum, the article has several policy implications**. First, it suggests that, overall, sanctions have been relatively useful in helping shortening civil wars, as the statistical association suggests.** Yet, this role needs improving. Concretely, our results suggest that any coercive measure should be preferably conducted by international organizations, especially, if it is conflict resolution what we are interested to promote. **Concerning the measures imposed, the evidence suggests that maximizing costs via embargoes is more effective than other sanction types. Multilateral arms embargoes can also result in increased chances of negotiated settlement,** although implementation problems so far have limited their effectiveness as remarked by many scholars.

## Smart sanctions are effective and respect human rights concerns

**Shagabutdinova & Berejikian 07**, Ella Shagabutdinova Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, Jeffrey Berejikian Department of International Affairs University of Georgia, “Deploying Sanctions while Protecting Human Rights: Are Humanitarian “Smart” Sanctions Effective?”, 2/24/07, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14754830601098386>

**The results of this study provide further support for the notion of smart sanctions and continued justification for the increasing momentum behind their use.** While advocates had argued convincingly that **such sanctions represent the best alternative with respect to the protection of human rights,** the effectiveness of such an approach remained largely unexamined. **The good news for advocates is that smart sanctions also appear to be more effective than the alternatives. Thus, policymakers need not choose between normative imperatives and effective policy.** These results should also comfort those who wish to construct a broader ethical framework for the deployment of economic coercion (e.g., Scharfen 1995: Ch. 5). Critics of trade sanctions have argued that the global community appears to be uninterested in coordinating policy with respect to the use of smart sanctions to protect human rights (Aznar-Gomez 2002). Instead, individual governments tackle the problem in an adhoc way. One explanation for this approach is that the level of international coordination required for effective financial sanctions is significant. Indeed, critics of smart sanctions have argued those who recommend them do so with “a total disregard for the realities of global politics” (Bull and Tostensen 1999/2000:133). Another possible explanation is that policymakers are not yet fully convinced of the utility of purely financial sanctions. One implication of the findings here is that better coordination on this issue is justified and that smart sanctions advocates are justified in pushing for a consensus. The current view that, “the international community needs to examine alternatives to comprehensive trade sanctions, which by their nature impact the weakest members of a society first and the leadership last and therefore violate basic principles of international law,” is now well-established (Normand 1996:43). **The findings here demonstrate that smart sanctions are a potentially attractive alternative.**

## For example, smart sanctions worked in Libya

George A. **Lopez 12**, University of Notre Dame, “In Defense of Smart Sanctions: A Response to Joy Gordon”, 4/10/12, Ethics & International Affairs Volume 26 Issue 1, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/in-defense-of-smart-sanctions-a-response-to-joy-gordon/6E227EB4D50921C7E9D746E2638754B7>

If there is a case to be made for both the utility and ethical defense of smart sanctions, it may be unfolding with the recent case of Libya, and the continuing tragedy of brutal violence in Syria, in which the European Union, the Arab League, and the United States have imposed strict sanctions even as the Security Council is deadlocked from doing so. When the UN Security Council passed resolutions  and , **there was widespread skepticism about these targeted sanctions. How could a set of asset freezes and travel bans on the Qaddafi family and a few cronies end the dictator’s assault on the Libyan people?** Certainly the fall of the Libyan regime would not have occurred without an armed rebellion and NATO’s military support. **But the combination of UN, EU, and U.S. smart sanctions played a considerable role in degrading both the regime’s firepower and its support among Libyan elites. By cutting off nearly half of Qaddafi’s usable monies** ($ billion was locked down in the first week of sanctions), **the international community immediately denied the dictator the ability to import additional heavy weapons, to hire mercenaries, or to contract with elite commando units. These constraints meant that Tripoli, for example, was not destroyed in an all-out battle. The humanitarian impact of sanctions was negligible,** **while without the sanctions the Libyan war would have been longer and deadlier.** **At the time of this writing, the United States, the EU, and the Arab League have levied heavy financial, travel, and investment sanctions on Syria, all of which dramatically constrain the short-term financial flexibility of the government and the economic elites who support it.** Collectively, they virtually end Syria’s banking role in the region and show outsiders that there is little future in investing in the country. The logic of sanctions now forces a moment of decision on Syrian elites regarding where their continued support for President Assad will lead. Not surprisingly, a vast majority of the Syrian people protesting in the street in recent months have welcomed these sanctions against the Assad regime, thus increasing their legitimacy. As the cases of Qaddafi and Assad illustrate, brutal dictators do not leave their posts quietly. **Well-defined, narrowly targeted sanctions can be—and already have been—an ethical and efficacious instrument for supporting the drive by citizens to peacefully replace leaders who have no interest in peace, democracy, or human rights. Sanctioning the scoundrels who kill their own people is a necessary, if not sufficient, tool for implementing the norm of the responsibility to protect civilians.** Such critics as Joy Gordon help sanctions researchers and practitioners keep the sanctions enterprise focused and honest. But we should not lose sight of the challenges and struggles with the interpretation of evidence, and we need more forward-focused analysis, such as I have attempted to provide here. Smart sanctions are not flawless, and there is plenty of room to improve their effectiveness, implementation, and due process, and to minimize their potential humanitarian impact. **But the experience of the last decade does not reveal an alternative technique that is more effective or more sensitive to humanitarian concerns. Rather, as threats to peace and security in varied forms have arisen over the past decade, smart sanctions have been the tool of choice for the Security Council because these mechanisms help accomplish Council goals.** **These tools work because the targeting of key individuals and entities has become more refined and because the financial weapons and other commodities that are locked down deny violent and abhorrent actors the resources they need to sustain violence.**

# Con Evidence

## Foreign aid is positively associated with the probability of democratic transition – and democratic donors are comparatively more likely to positively affect democracy transition

Sarah Blodgett **Bermeo 2011**, Duke University, “Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent”, World Development Vol. 39, No. 11, 2011, http://www.sarahbermeo.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Bermeo\_WDfinal.pdf

Several recent studies have examined the link between foreign aid and the likelihood of regime transition, particularly movements toward democracy. It has been difficult, however, to assess the role of donor intent in the observed relationships. **Using the newly released AidData database** (Tierney et al., 2011), I am able to compare aid from two groups of donors with plausibly different intent regarding democratization. **The analysis finds no evidence that aid from democratic donors works to entrench authoritarian regimes in the post-cold war period**. **Aid from these donors often has a positive association with the probability of a democratic transition.** It is difficult to determine whether this relationship is the result of aid directly affecting the chances of democratization, or of democratic donors disproportionately channeling aid to countries where they believe democratization is most likely. **Each of these is consistent with donors prioritizing democratic transitions, either by using aid to help bring them about or by rewarding countries on the verge of having a transition.** There is no evidence that authoritarian donors are driven by similar intent. They give to a smaller group of countries, perhaps ones that are less likely to experience a democratic transition. In this group of countries, **receiving more aid from authoritarian sources is associated with a lower probability of undergoing a transition to democracy.** **Within the group of authoritarian countries receiving aid from authoritarian donors, there is no evidence that aid from democratic donors dampens the likelihood of democratic transitions—at worst it is neutral**. This is quite telling. In a set of countries where evidence shows that some types of outside financing—in this case aid from authoritarian sources—is associated with regime entrenchment, democratic donors are able to avoid their dollars exhibiting the same relationship. And, it is not because they give less money to these countries: on average, they give a similar amount to countries that do and do not also receive authoritarian aid. **Rather, they have found ways to give money without further entrenching the regime**. **This is strong evidence that not all aid revenues should be treated alike by scholars, and that donor intent matters in determining aid outcomes.** The findings are particularly significant given the recent increases in aid from authoritarian donors, such as China and several Middle Eastern countries. While detailed data are only available for a subset of these donors, evidence suggests that Chinese aid has grown rapidly in recent years, from $1.5 billion in 2003 to $25 billion in 2007; China also places low conditionality on its aid, and certainly does not prioritize democratization (Lum, Fischer, Gomez-Granger, & Leland, 2009). Democratic donors have voiced concerns over the potential effects of this increase in authoritarian aid, and it appears their fears may be justified. **When donors fail to prioritize democratization, or when they give aid directly to authoritarian recipient governments with few strings attached, aid is likely to help the government maintain power.** The evidence above even suggests that the presence of authoritarian aid may weaken the positive association between democratic aid and the probability of democratization, perhaps indicating limits on conditionality when a less conditional source of funding is available. Further research is needed to determine the impact of authoritarian aid in areas other than democratization, such as development. For now, it is clear that democratic donors cannot ignore the effects of authoritarian aid if they wish to make their own aid strategies as effective as possible.

## A systemic review of the literature shows aid positively impacts democratization

Rachel M. **Gisselquist and** Miguel **Niño-Zarazúa 21**, United Nations University (UNU), “Does aid support democracy? A systematic review of the literature”, January 2021, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348761191\_Does\_aid\_support\_democracy\_A\_systematic\_review\_of\_the\_literature

In this section, we discuss the main findings of the systematic review. Table A1 in the Appendix A provides a summary of the studies included in the systematic review. What is immediately apparent is the variety of outcomes used to proxy for democratization and the mixed results on the effect of aid. Whereas some studies find a straightforward negative or positive relationship, others condition the effect of aid on a variety of country-level characteristics. The synthesis of evidence in Table 1 further shows the aid typology focus within the literature, as the overwhelming majority operationalize aid as total aid in the form of project interventions, with fewer studies considering core contributions, technical assistance, and budget support, or democracy aid or its component parts. **Overall, these findings point to a positive impact for aid on democracy. In particular, they suggest that democracy aid generally supports rather than hinders democracy building around the world, while its effectiveness is likely influenced by aid modalities and recipient country context**; and that democracy aid is more associated with positive impact on democracy than developmental aid. **They suggest broadly that aid produces more positive results when it is directed to specific actors and institutions, consistent with the political approach to aid and with institutional and agency-based theories of democratization**. Findings from this systematic review further suggest that (1) there is room for more analyses of the impacts of other modalities and types of aid; (2) it is important to understand the efficacy of these modalities and types, particularly as they relate to institutional and/or agency-based democratization models; and (3) the data on democracy aid by type of modality are limited, so any argument in favour of or against a particular aid modality should be interpreted with caution, as such arguments rely on very limited information.

## High levels of aid and conditioned leverage is associated with an increased probability of failure rises significantly

Camilo **Nieto-Matiz and** Luis L. **Schenoni 18**, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, “Backing Despots? Foreign Aid and the Survival of Autocratic Regimes”, December 2018, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 2020, VOL. 16, NO. 1, 36–58 https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2018.1555691

We now turn to the empirical results of our quantitative analysis. We show our results in Table 1 from three different models. For all three models, as shown in Appendix A, we conduct proportionality tests and obtain p values greater than 0.05 for each individual variable as well as for the global model. This suggests that our estimations do not violate the proportionality assumption and that our inferences are indeed correct. In the first model, we estimate whether foreign aid, by itself, has any impact on autocratic duration; in Model 2, we include an interaction term between the per capita aid in a country and the proportion of aid coming from democratic donors. This second term is important, as it specifies the extent to which a recipient’s aid allocation is dependent on democratic donors in a given year. In the third model, **we estimate an interaction effect between foreign aid and the specific leverage of the United States vis-à-vis the autocratic regime. All of our models control for coup events, population density, GDP per capita, economic growth, and oil production.** Results from Model 1 suggest that higher levels of foreign aid decrease the hazard rate of autocratic failure. Although the coefficient is not statistically significant, the negative relationship is consistent with some of the findings in the literature, according to which unearned income—such as oil or foreign aid—has deleterious consequences for development and democratization.59 The remaining models, however, suggest that this is only partially true. Instead, **we find statistical evidence to contend that democratic leverage, in particular that exerted by the United States, plays an important role in explaining the heterogeneous effects of foreign aid on autocratic survival.** In Model 2, **we explore how autocratic duration is affected by the interaction between per capita ODA and the proportion of aid coming from democratic countries.** **The positive hazard rate of the interaction term indicates that foreign aid has a negative effect on autocratic survival as the proportion of aid coming from democratic donors increases.** To better understand the effect of foreign aid conditional on different levels of democratic aid, we simulate the marginal effects and plot them in the left-hand panel of Figure 3. Some elements are worth noting: first, the curve’s shape in Figure 3 is consistent with the hypothesis specified for Model 2, namely that foreign aid is likely to shorten the longevity of autocracies as the proportion of democratic aid increases. Indeed, when looking at the marginal effects of democratic aid conditional on levels of aid per capita, it is possible to see that the magnitude of democratic aid is positive and significant at almost all levels of per capita foreign aid. **Importantly, in autocracies receiving aid from democratic donors, larger amounts of aid are likely to have larger impacts on their regimes than smaller amounts of aid. Larger amounts of aid are probably more effective because they are able to more rapidly transform autocracies’ political conditions.** **Not coincidentally, as suggested by Figure 2, the largest donors are also those countries with the most exemplary democracies. In fact, while our argument suggests that democratic donors’ leverage is likely to affect autocratic survival, we argue that it is a matter of degree: the greater the leverage a democratic country has over an autocracy, the more vulnerable the autocratic recipient is.** We further investigate the moderating effect of democratic donors by focusing on the impact of the United States, a quintessential case of democratic leverage in the international system. To do so, Model 3 estimates an interaction term between foreign aid and United States leverage—as measured by Lake’s security hierarchy. The results suggest that increasing levels of democratic leverage vis-à-vis an autocratic regime moderates the impact of foreign aid on autocracies’ longevity. The right-hand panel in Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of foreign aid on autocratic failure at different levels of United States leverage. As the plot suggests, foreign aid has an increasing positive effect on autocratic survival as this leverage increases. More specifically, in cases where the United States exerts no leverage over an autocratic recipient, an additional unit of foreign aid has a negative effect on autocratic failure. **As democratic leverage increases, however, foreign aid begins to have a positive impact on the failure of autocracies.** **For instance, in cases where the United States has a strong leverage (i.e., leverage = 5), an additional unit of foreign aid increases the risk of autocratic failure by over 50 percent.** While there are few cases where democracies had such a high influence, **the figure suggests that even at lower values of United States leverage, its moderating effect on autocratic survival is still significant**: **in autocracies with a United States leverage of around 1, an additional unit of foreign aid yields an estimated increase of around 10 percent.** Since almost 23 percent of the cases of our sample have a level of United States leverage between .5 and 1.5, this is a meaningful result. In addition to this, we plot the surface response of the interaction between foreign aid and United States leverage in Figure 4. Surface plots are useful tools to visualize the interaction effect of two continuous variables (represented on the two horizontal axes) on a particular outcome (represented on the vertical axis), where the direction of the arrows indicates larger values of the variable. Lighter shades are areas of higher joint density between the interacting variables. **Overall, the figure suggests that autocracies’ probability of failure is highest when Washington exerts an important leverage over them**: **in the upper left area of the plot, where larger values of foreign aid and United States leverage converge, the probability of autocratic leverage is highest.** **In support for our hypothesis, the plot corroborates that foreign aid does not automatically become an important “survival resource” for autocrats, so long as the United States exerts an important leverage on the autocratic regime.** When observed more carefully, **the plot also shows that under a strong United States leverage, the probability of autocratic failure increases when foreign aid is higher than when it is lower.** In sum, while foreign aid may have a perverse effect in prolonging the life of autocracies, this effect is likely to be altered when the country is strongly influenced by a powerful democracy. Our results do not necessarily contradict the fact that foreign aid can prolong the life of autocratic regimes. After all, autocrats are aware that windfall resources provide political power and prevent the population from engaging in active accountability.60 However, we do provide a more nuanced explanation to the state of the literature. **In particular, our results indicate that strong democratic leverage, such as that exerted by the United States, is a key factor that accounts for the diverging results.**

## Economic aid is associated with transitioning to multiparty regimes and democracy aid helps to stabilize these regimes

Simone **Dietrich and** Joseph **Wright 15**, Wright of Pennsylvania State University and Dietrich of University of Missouri, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa”, January 2015, The Journal of Politics, 77(1), 216–234. doi:10.1086/678976

The findings suggest several insights into the relationship between foreign aid, democratic transition, and consolidation in Africa. **While economic aid is a catalyst for transitions to multiparty party regimes, democracy aid stabilizes multiparty regimes and decreases the incidence of electoral misconduct, which we interpret as increasing horizontal accountability.** Importantly, neither of these outcomes may necessarily threaten incumbent governments in institutionalized multiparty regimes. However, we find little evidence that either economic or democracy aid increases the competitiveness of the opposition, which is a necessary condition for incumbent turnover. **This sugggests that the primary channel through which democracy promotion occurs is government-led political reform. In short, we find evidence consistent with both the leverage mechanism linking economic aid to multiparty transitions as well as the investment mechanism linking democracy aid to consolidation outcomes—but only those that do not necessarily threaten incumbents.**

## Technical assistance increases political liberalization and monitoring can reduce corruption, forcing political rights to be recognized

Clark C. **Gibson**, Barak D. **Hoffman, and** Ryan S. **Jablonski 15**, University of California, San Diego, World Bank, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Did aid promote democracy in Africa?: the role of technical assistance in Africa’s transitions”, April 2015, World Development, 68. pp. 323-335. ISSN 0305-750X, DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.11.009

**Did foreign aid play a role in Africa’s political transformation after the Cold War**? After decades of authoritarian rule, the majority of these regimes came to an abrupt and unexpected collapse in the 1990s. Africa’s political liberalization was slow at first.1 Some autocrats established certain civil rights such as the permission to organize opposition parties. Others allowed a freer press.2 Still others created commissions to examine the country’s constitution. **In most countries, these initial movements eventually led to multiparty elections so that by 1994 29 countries had held 54 elections, with observers judging the majority as “free.” These elections boasted high turnouts and many opposition victories: voters removed eleven sitting presidents, and three more had declined to run in these contests.** During 1995-97, 16 countries staged second-round elections and by 1998 only four countries in all of sub-Saharan Africa had not staged some sort of competitive contest. Given the continent’s poor record of competitive elections in the post-independence period, rapid political liberalization during this time was a monumental political change. Despite the magnitude and extent of these changes, scholars’ accounts of these transitions have had only limited success (Gibson, 2002). Many studies argue for the primacy of domestic forces, such as economic crisis or political protest (e.g., Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Westebbe, 1994). **Others note the rapid collapse of autocracy at the end of the Cold War and suggest that international factors fostered the changes** (e.g., Huntington, 1993). Some studies suggest that foreign aid may have contributed to democratization (e.g., Gibbon, Ofstad, & Bangura, 1992; Nelson, 1990; Resnick and van de Walle 2013). **After the fall of the Soviet Union, donors paid increasing attention to political reforms and began attaching conditions to their assistance; a number of anecdotes suggest that elections were in part a response to these pressures**. Yet others contend that foreign aid has instead had the effect of entrenching autocrats in power by increasing the resources available for patronage (e.g., Bates, 1994; Brautigam, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 2001; Morrison, 2009; Rodrik, 1996). **We argue that foreign aid did both: in earlier periods, aid increased resources available for patronage. However in the 1980s and 90s donors paid attention to government spending and corruption, making it more difficult for governments to use foreign aid for patronage systems. Enhanced monitoring essentially reduced the resources a political leader could employ to remain in power. We argue that such a reduction in resources, and with few alternatives to maintain patronage networks, Africa’s incumbents during this period were forced to concede political rights to their opponents.** To test whether higher levels of monitoring contributed to political liberalization, we separate technical assistance from other forms of aid. Apart from a few studies (Finkel et al. 2007; Scott and Steele 2011; Resnick & Van de Walle 2013) much of the literature exploring aid’s effects on democracy does not disaggregate foreign assistance into its various types (Djankov et al. 2008; Dunning 2004; Goldsmith 2001; Knack 2004; Wright 2009). **We argue that technical assistance is associated with a higher degree of donor oversight than other aid modalities, and should have the marginal effect of decreasing fungible resources and promoting liberalization**. In contrast, other types of aid should have little effect on liberalization. We find robust evidence that supports our claims: **When technical assistance as a share of GDP increases, the probability of political liberalization also increases and fewer resources are available for patronage.** We see no such effect for other forms of aid; in fact, we see an increase in patronage spending under some specifications. Previous work has also been limited by available measures of democratization which frequently lump together a number of institutional features which have, at best, an ambiguous relationship with foreign aid and the objectives of donor organizations. To improve upon this approach, we code an original dataset that includes different types of actions associated with political liberalization that political leaders cam take, from a formal announcement that political liberalization will take place to the actual staging of a free and fair multiparty presidential election. We argue that our approach offers a more direct measure of how we should expect leaders to respond to the monitoring effects of foreign aid.

## Foreign aid promotes women’s rights especially in nations with more human rights violations

Daniella **Donno and** Sarah **Fox et. Al 2018**, Donno is an Associate Professor in Department of Political Science at University of Pittsburgh, Fox and Kassik are PhD Candidates in the Department of Political Science at University of Pittsburgh, “Compliance or Camouflage? Foreign Aid, International Norms, and Incentives for Women’s Rights in Dictatorships”, Sage Journals, 9/24/2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211024306

Analysts, and critics, of democracy promotion have noted that international actors face a number of conflicting objectives in their efforts to promote political transformation abroad, including the tension between promoting democracy and promoting peace in war-torn societies; the potentially anti-democratic consequences of power-sharing and state-building; as well as the possible trade-off between stability and democracy.44 **We draw attention, instead, to the interplay between the objectives of promoting women’s rights and electoral competition—-two areas that are increasingly bundled within the same international regime. Because implementation of women’s rights is less directly costly than electoral liberalization, autocrats may seek to make progress on the former in order to camouflage, or deflect attention from, lack of progress on the latter.** Our point is not that international democracy promoters are naive or are “fooled” by such a strategy; **rather, because women’s rights are genuinely valued, progress toward gender equality tends understandably to be met with praise, rewards and an easing of pressure.** Further work in this research agenda will explore the preferences and beliefs of those working in foreign aid and democracy promotion more directly. Do they in fact view progress on gender equality as progress toward democracy? Do they support rewarding legal advances in women’s rights in dictatorships? Does this willingness to reward—-if present—-differ for closed versus electoral authoritarian regimes? Another consequential aspect of our findings is the contrast between how democracies and dictatorships respond to international normative pressure. Among democracies, we see that Western aid and negative publicity for human rights violations is associated with political liberalization that deepens electoral competitiveness, but less so with de jure progress on women’s rights. **Dictatorships, however, respond in the opposite manner: aid dependence and (more marginally) human rights shaming are associated with women’s rights reforms but not with electoral liberalization**. Moreover, when liberalization does occur in dictatorships, it is not linked with a subsequent increase in legislative activity for women’s rights, whereas in democracies it is. Thus, in democracies, political reform and women’s rights are complements but in dictatorships, the two are substitutes. This supports the idea that reforms for gender equality are primarily driven by government-led initiatives in dictatorships rather than resulting from processes of open political contestation. This is not to say that societal pressure does not matter in authoritarian regimes, but due to their high degree of insulation, leaders retain far more discretion as to the depth and timing of reforms than in democracies. The story of Saudi Arabia’s recent reforms for women’s rights depicts this dynamic, in which pressure from the women’s movement certainly played a role by drawing out negative publicity but does not appear to be the proximate or direct cause of Mohammad bin Salman’s decision to initiate steps toward the modernization of gender relations. Finally, our theory, and our measures, relate to the de jure advancement of women’s rights. As we show, progress on paper does not necessarily imply progress in practice, particularly in autocracies. In a sense, this is precisely our point. **We expect governments to take the types of steps that will be noticed and rewarded by the international (Western) community, and ample evidence indicates that aid organizations, lenders and foreign governments pay the most attention to changes in laws.** **More subtle—and difficult to measure—outcomes relating to implementation, enforcement, and the actual status of women in society receive less focused attention and certainly have less impact on the allocation of loans, aid and other international benefits. This is perhaps why critics deride the impact of international normative pressure as being superficial and fleeting. Yet, we believe such criticism is misplaced.** **While legal change is not an immediate panacea for gender inequality, it can set long-term processes of mobilization and enforcement in motion. It creates an opportunity structure more favorable for women to press their claims by pointing to the government’s own commitments (Simmons 2009). It can spark processes of “spiraling” transnational pressure (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 2000, 2013).** Future work will do well to examine in greater detail the relationship between de jure and de facto change for women living in dictatorships–a subject that we gave only preliminary attention to here–including whether factors such as rule of law, state capacity or feminist mobilization mediate the relationship between changes in law and de facto changes in women’s lived experience.

## Democracy aid reduces likelihood of conflict – every dollar of aid reduces conflict by 4% per thousand citizens and democratizing states who do not receive aid are 4x more likely to experience civil wars

Burcu **Savun and** Daniel C. **Tirone 11**, University of Pittsburgh, “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, April 2011, Pp. 233–246, DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00501.x

Model 1 in Table 1 presents the result of our base logit estimation.12 In line with our expectations, the interaction of Democracy Aid ∗ Democratization is negative, and the conditional coefficient of Democracy Aid and the interaction term is statistically significant.13 **This suggests that democratizing states that receive higher levels of aid are less likely to experience conflict than those that receive less aid. Substantively, the conflict-dampening effect of every dollar of aid per thousand citizens is around 4%.14** This finding supports our hypothesis. **We also find that democratization is conflict enhancing: democratizing states which do not receive democratization aid are over four times more likely to experience civil wars than nonaid recipients.** **Democracy Aid is itself statistically insignificant, indicating that democracy aid has no effect upon the likelihood of experiencing a conflict outside of democratization.** Since our expectation of the effect of aid on conflict pertains to the democratization period, this is not a surprising finding. Of the controls, **higher levels of economic development reduce the probability of an initiation, while countries with larger populations are more likely to experience conflict.** One important issue researchers need to address when they estimate the effect of aid on conflict is the possibly endogenous process of aid allocation. If the presence or immediate threat of a conflict influences donors’ decision-making calculus regarding whom to give aid and how much to allocate, the model would be nonrecursive and potentially biased. This is of particular concern if donors anticipate the outbreak of conflict and adjust the aid allocation accordingly.15 If donors decrease aid to countries in which a conflict is thought to be imminent, aid would then go predominantly to countries at peace, and a pacifying effect of democratization aid may be a reflection of this selection. A priori, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that donors might actually increase the amount of aid flows to war-prone countries due to strategic considerations.

## **Military aid is successful in preventing terrorists from achieving their objectives**

Navin A. **Bapat 11**, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 4/8/11, “Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent, Journal of Peace Research, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343310394472>

Applying these insights to the problem of transnational terrorism, we might expect that military aid may minimize terrorism, but might also exacerbate the conditions that led to the formation of terrorist groups in the first place. For example, several empirical studies demonstrate that countries with poor state capacity, heavy corruption, and low per capita GDP scores are likely to experience violent insurgencies (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2004). These studies suggest that military aid increases the corruption of hosts and creates disincentives for hosts to invest in their population, which in turn may negatively affect economic growth. Similarly, since we see an inverse relationship between democratic development and military aid, one might conclude that military aid stifles democratization. Additionally, numerous studies examining foreign aid more generally argue that external assistance worsens the problem of terrorism. Although foreign aid is intended to alleviate poverty, which is considered a cause of terrorism, studies at the individual level indicate that terrorists tend to be drawn from relatively wealthier individuals (Kruegar & Maleckova, 2003). Therefore, foreign aid may create an increased number of wealthier citizens while stifling democratic development, which may actually increase terrorist recruiting. These observations raise the question: why do policymakers continue to use military aid if there is such an abundance of evidence that it is unlikely to reduce the problem of terrorism? One possibility may be that **scholars have a relatively narrow definition of what constitutes success against terrorism. Typically, scholars view a policy as a successful anti-terrorist instrument if it reduces the number of terrorist attacks, decreases the number of groups that are operational, or contributes to the collapse of a group** (Azam & Thelen, 2010; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas, 2009). **While these are certainly reasonable metrics, it is possible that an additional goal of military aid is simply to prevent terrorists from accomplishing their objectives. For example, military aid may not be successful in preventing terrorists from engaging in attacks, but may be successful in preventing a government from pursuing conciliatory policies toward these groups.** **Military aid might also increase the length of time that terrorists must fight in order to accomplish their strategic objectives. Since most groups collapse quickly, this increase in duration may make it impossible for terrorists to accomplish their goals** (Bapat, 2005; Cronin, 2009; Jones & Libicki, 2008). **If we therefore expand our definition of success so that it is not limited to just a reduction in terrorist attacks, we may see that** **military aid gives hosts the power to both resist the demands of terrorists and endure the cost of conflict.** To illustrate with an example, consider the case of the US/Yemeni relationship. In 2000, Al-Qaeda launched an attack against the USS Cole. This attack, while not particularly crippling, demonstrated that Al-Qaeda was becoming increasingly brazen in its activities. In response, the USA increased its military support for the Yemeni government.4 If we examine the effect of this policy after ten years, the fact that Al-Qaeda still appears to be operational within Yemen might lead to the conclusion that the military aid provided to the Yemeni government was a failure. However**, if we consider that Yemen is not a particularly strong state, whereas Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to be a relatively stronger group, an alternative policy for Yemen might have been to negotiate a deal with Al-Qaeda in which it allowed the group to conduct anti-American attacks from its territory. However, with US military support, Yemen continues to profess its support for US policy objectives. In this case, even though Al-Qaeda has not been disarmed, one might consider the fact that Yemen remained loyal to the USA as a policy success.**

## US Security Assistance prevents democratic backsliding and helps achieves security objectives

Christopher Morton 18, Christopher A. Morton, Major United States Marine Corps, “HOW DOES UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE AFFECT HOST NATION DEMOCRATIZATION?”, June 2018, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1060022.pdf>

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. **I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.** Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. **It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc.** My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization. Does U.S. SA support host nation democratization? **I argue that U.S. SA can help prevent democratic backsliding, but it does not actively support democratization in the way that it is typically designed and resourced. If the United States supported host nation democratization via its inspirational democratic example (e.g., protecting human rights and individual liberties), then U.S. SA was not the conduit for broadcasting the U.S. democratic example. The evidence showed that two spikes in U.S. SA (between 0.8% and 1.4% of host nation GDP) were quickly followed by increases in democratization, but the largest spike in U.S. SA (upwards of 1.52% of host nation GDP, and conditioned on democracy-related reforms) did not increase democratization.** 590 If aid conditionality supports host nation democratization, then the case studies indicate that the threshold is between 0.25% and 0.60% of host nation GDP.591 **The evidence in both cases supported the idea that U.S. SA reinforced host nation security, which helped prevent state collapse and democratic backsliding, though it did not increase democratization.** If U.S. security sector assistance generally supports host nation security sector reform—which then improved its civilmilitary relations and democratic governance—then the case studies indicated the threshold is above 10.5% of annual U.S. SA to the host nation.592 Overall, the cases provided little evidence to support this argument and plenty of evidence to undermine it. Does U.S. SA undermine host nation democratization? I argue that **U.S. SA does not undermine democratization as it is currently designed and resourced, but it could have an anti-democratic influence under the same design with excessive funding.** Does U.S. SA to oppressive authoritarians’ security apparatuses undermine democratization? The case of Pakistan revealed two increases in democracy shortly after large spikes in U.S. SA given to military dictators, and both of those SA packages lacked democratic conditionality.593 If this mechanism is generalizable, then the activation threshold is above 0.85% of host nation GDP.594 Pakistan’s positive public opinion of U.S. personal freedoms in the 2000s undermined the argument that a bad U.S. democratic example deters host nation democratization.595 Both cases undermined the argument that Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy. Both gave ample evidence of domestic and regional factors that can explain different forms of host nation democracy. I found no evidence that either country feared a Western-sponsored democratic revolution. The most compelling causal mechanism was that U.S. SA (especially when it lacks democratic conditionality) creates an aid dependency dynamic. If U.S. SA reinforces a rentier class in the host nation society, then it likely undermined democracy. Before 2008, U.S. SA to Pakistan was below 6.14% and was followed by democratization. 596 After the 2008 increase in democracy, Pakistan’s Freedom House rating stayed at 4.5 through 2017; and from 2010–2014, U.S. SA averaged 7.37% of Pakistan’s government revenue. 597 This causal mechanism may activate when U.S. SA is above 6.14% of host nation government revenue, but that assumes that Pakistan has a notable rentier dynamic. If Pakistan does have a rentier dynamic, then U.S. SA was a notable contributor to it. I found that Pakistan’s military economy predated U.S. SA, and so U.S. SA may have entrenched it slightly, but it did not alter the fundamental dynamic of state governance. In short, U.S. SA and other aid sources were insufficient to create a rentier dynamic that did not already exist**. I argue that U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to domestic and regional actors. It is designed to accomplish U.S. security objectives. The programs capable of driving institutional reform are a meager share of overall U.S. SA. U.S. SA is rarely integrated with a whole-of-government effort for supporting host nation democratization, and when one could argue it is, the quantity and duration of funding is inadequate to supersede the influence of domestic and regional actors**. When the host nation’s security interests diverge from those of the United States (e.g., post-9/11 Pakistan), the resulting agency loss increases the threshold of U.S. SA necessary to have a significant influence. **Despite the stated theme of democracy promotion in U.S. policy documents, U.S. SA was primarily designed to accomplish security objectives. By design it was not able to compete with domestic and regional actors, and by quantity it is not enough to significantly influence host nation democratization.**

## Developmental intervention creates stability in the region and helps provide critical resources

Gary Milante and Suranjan Weeraratne 10, The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge”, 07/29/2010, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, <http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/pdf/wdr%20background%20paper_refugees_0.pdf>

**By the end of 2009, 75 % of global refugees were hosted in neighboring countries, often in protracted situations. While 10% of the refugees live in fragile states or situations, about 54% of refugees are hosted in neighboring countries that are non-fragile, non-OECD lower middleincome countries.** There are also cases where refugee populations in a non-fragile, non-OECD lower middle-income country settle in low-income, fragile sub-national regions. Countries that host refugees for protracted periods can experience long-term economic, social, environmental, and political and security impacts. While the impacts of a refugee presence on neighboring countries are complex and context-specific, they are not necessarily only negative. The economic impacts of refugee presence on neighboring countries have been both negative (e.g. uncompensated public expenditure and burden on the economic infrastructure) and positive (e.g. stimulated local economies by increasing the size of local markets and reducing commodity prices). The positive contributions that refugees can make to the economy of host countries should be viewed in terms of winners and losers among both refugees and host populations. **Development assistance targeting areas affected by displacement can play a strategic role in mitigating negative impacts and increasing the positive impacts of a protracted refugee presence on host countries.** The social impacts of refugees – also context-specific – include inequalities between refugees and non-refugees and the resulting social tensions, which can be reduced by development projects targeting both refugees and the host communities. **The environmental impact of refugees can also be alleviated through a combination of dispersed refugee settlement and targeted area development interventions.** Similarly, some of the political and security impacts associated with the presence of refugees can be mitigated by a comprehensive framework to secure stability and development through sustainable solutions for displaced people. Furthermore, the growing number of refugees in urban settings also requires new approaches to effectively address the needs of the displaced in the context of urban planning and development. As mentioned earlier, in a number of refugee situations around the world, **development interventions have been used to mitigate the negative impacts and increase the positive impacts of the presence of refugees in host countries. CIREFCA‟s quick impact projects have provided social services that benefited refugees and host communities. This approach also contributed to secure stability and development in the region.** **Another success story is the IGPRA project in Pakistan, which provided employment opportunities for about 11% of the Afghan refugee population as well as local poor through labor-intensive projects.** These projects have also compensated some of the physical damage that refugees caused to the infrastructure and environment. **In addition, the Zambia Initiative, through its community-based development projects, has been instrumental in addressing the negative economic, social and environmental impacts associated with protracted presence of over 100,000 Angolan refugees**. These examples illustrate that even in a refugee crisis, there are development opportunities that may bring benefits to the refugees and host populations, and also prepare the refugees for an eventual return to their home countries. **Moreover, when additional resources are channeled through development interventions systematically, they can help to create sustainable solutions for refugees, which can be helpful in stabilizing the region.** These examples are exceptions rather than the rule regarding how protracted refugee situations are addressed. The scope for finding sustainable solutions to displacement is critically influenced by political and economic conditions, which frame the opportunities and constraints for pursuing such solutions.

## Empirically, economic sanctions leads to worse human rights outcomes

Emanuel Ingold 13, Department of Politics and International Studies PAIS The University of Warwick, “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Respect for Human Rights after the End of the Cold War”, 08/05/2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2299765

Soon after the imposition of a sanction regime, respect for human rights recovers. **This recovery is slightly delayed for anocratic regimes where a low of .34 is reached in year +2 before more or less staying constant until year +15. In autocratic states respect for human slowly increases between year 0 and year +15.** In democratic states, sanctions do not have a negative impact on respect for human rights. In contrast, respect for human rights increases slowly but steadily during the whole period from year -5 until year +15 without any major decrease. **In summary, respect for human rights is on average much higher during the whole 26- year period in democratic states compared with nondemocratic states.** In democracies, respect for human rights increases from year 0 on. **In the case of anocratic states, respect for human rights decreases further after the imposition of a sanction regime.** As Marinov (2005, 576) **explains, this is a reaction by the leaders in place to hold onto power and to fight against destabilization of their leadership.** **Anocratic leaders are less likely to be in a stable position than autocratic ones as outlined by Fearon and Laitin (2005, 1) for the case of the Dominican Republic.** **The leadership is therefore tempted to increase repression and decrease respect for human rights in their countries.** Also here, there exists a risk of multicolinearity. I take political rights into account in my human rights score, a determining part of a regime type definition. Overall, however, hypothesis 2 is verified because it is the case mainly for anocratic and democratic regimes, but not as conclusive for autocratic ones.

## Sanctions are not effective tools to address genocide or politicide and may create a worse humanitarian disaster

Matthew Krain 16, Department of Political Science The College of Wooster, “The effect of economic sanctions on the severity of genocides or politicides”, 10/18/2016, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1240516

**This study examined whether and how economic sanctions could affect the severity of ongoing instances of genocide or politicide.** **Sanctions were found to have no effect on atrocity severity, either on their own on in combination with other policy tools such as intervention or naming and shaming.** **They neither aggravate atrocities, as some of the academic literature expect, nor alleviate them, as assumed by many policymakers and advocates (and some researchers).** These findings hold regardless of whether they are measured as the number or mere presence of sanctions, their cost, level of comprehensiveness, duration, or whether they are imposed or administered by an international organization. **Threats of sanctions also have no effect on genocide or politicide severity, either on their own or when combined with other policy options, similarly contrary to much of the literature.** These results suggest the need for policymakers and advocates who routinely call for economic sanctions to reconsider their utility in slowing or stopping the worst atrocities. **Sanctions, alone or together, threatened or implemented, targeted or comprehensively applied, have little impact on the magnitude of the killing.** **Raising the costs of genocide or politicide can be effective in mitigating mass murder, but clearly economic sanctions do not raise the costs sufficiently to make perpetrators abandon this lethal policy. Moreover, given the research that ties sanctions to worsening human rights and public health outcomes, sanctions may complicate the situation on the ground for other civilians not being targeted by the perpetrating regime, creating an even wider humanitarian disaster.** **That alone should be enough to give pause to those who will point to evidence in this article that sanctions don’t make things worse for the targets of mass atrocities.** Of course, this study is but a step forward in our understanding of the toolbox available to those interested in mitigating ongoing mass killing. Future work needs to revisit this relationship, and expand the examination of tools available to policymakers when faced with such massive atrocities. Furthermore, this study has demonstrated that examining the interactions between policy tools may also be a fruitful avenue of research. For policymakers to have a fully functioning toolbox, they need to know how tools work (or do not work) in combination to fix (or perhaps exacerbate) a particular problem. Future work should emphasize the interactions between the various tools that slow or stop the killing.

## Economic sanctions severely harm civilians – Iraq shows sanctions cause unemployment, inflation, increased food prices, shortages of doctors and medical supplies, cause mental health issues in children, and more

Mohamad A. Khalil 04, Fairmont State College, “TOWARD MORE HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO IRAQs”, 2004, https://swer.wtamu.edu/sites/default/files/Data/13%20-%2026-213-788-1-PB.pdf

IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAQ Woodrow Wilson, the thirty- fourth president, once spoke to the League of Nations describing economic sanctions as follows: “A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings pressure outside upon the nation that, in my judgment, no modern nation can resist.” President Wilson was right, **a comprehensive economic sanction may surpass the damage of “total war,” in size of human and economic costs.** **In wartime, only the soldiers are subject to enemy attacks; civilians are supposedly not. Even the siege and blockades of civilians are considered as immoral because the civilians are innocent. There are several international laws that demand protection of civilians from the indiscriminate effects of siege.** For example, the fourth Geneva convention (article 23) requires free passage of medical supplies for civilians and foodstuffs for children under fifteen and the first Geneva protocol (1977) (articles 69-71) requires that essential humanitarian supplies be provided to the civilian’s in non-occupied territory if the civilian population is threatened in its survival (Christiansen and Powers,1995). **Comprehensive economic sanctions hit everybody in society, including the poor and young children. Economic sanctions reduce the level of employment and increase the rate of inflation faster than the income growth rate. Thus, most of the people will feel the cold of unemployment and the heat of inflation.** **In Iraq, for example, the unemployment rate has been estimated at 70 percent in the industrial sector. At the same time, food prices were 4000 to 5000 times their August 1990 level, while monthly salaries of most wage earners ranged between 3000 to 5000 dinars** (FAO, 1995). At 5000 dinars monthly income, a person can buy thirty eggs, two kilograms of beef and a few kilograms of vegetables and fruits. A family of six (the average family size) needs at least 200,000 dinars a month to have the minimum calories required (providing 3,000 kilocalorie per person per day). The government coupons (ration) provide about 37 percent of the calories needed; a family of six would still need approximately 125,000 dinars monthly to purchase the shortfall in food. **Per capita income reaches the lowest in the world (about $44), less than income of an Indian villager (UN Children’s Fund, 1993). Increasing food prices restricted the population’s access to essential food. Malnutrition quickly emerged as one of the biggest threats to Iraqi children and their mothers.** According to the World Health Organization (1996), **the percentage of low birth weight babies (less than 2.5 kilograms) quadruped from 4 percent in August 1990 to 17 percent in late 1992 and 22 percent in 1995. Sanctions have resulted in shortages of doctors and medical supplies.** **It is being reported that some hospitals have lost up to 75 percent of their pre-1990 staff** (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1995). Hospitals also are short of vaccines, syringes, anesthetics, surgery tools, radiology, and laboratory and diagnostic tests. Beth Osborne Daponte (1993), of the United States Census Bureau, **estimated that 111,000 civilians died in 1991 from the health effect of the Gulf War, of these deaths 70,000 were children under fifteen years of age, while another 8,500 were people of sixty-five years or older**. **The health conditions further deteriorated in recent years. FAO (1995) estimated the death rate of children under five years old to be five times higher than during the immediate prewar (1990) period. The team appointed by FAO reached the conclusion that about 500,000 children died in the five years period following the Gulf War between 1991 and 1995.** The critical shortage of drugs is still a problem to physician. A doctor at Saddam Hospital lost about seventy-five children during a two-week epidemic of chest infection and gastroenteritis. He believed every one of then could have been saved with antibiotics, which are commonly available in neighboring countries (Kinzer 1998). As of February 2002, shortages in the medical supplies are very common. A doctor at the Basra Maternity complained about the irregularity of the medical supplies to the Hadani Ditmars of the San Francisco Chronicle (2002), “We have fewer drugs available this year than we had last year” the doctor continued to say “But the real problem is that we don’t have consistency, so that a patient may not have a full course of say, antibiotics or other drugs, and therefore will not heal properly with an incomplete course.” **Deteriorating standards of living in Iraq also are reflecting on women’s health and children’s behavior. A research done by Bhatia and Kawar (1992) found 60 percent of women suffered from psychological problems, such as depression, anxiety, headache, and insomnia.** During the same time, Raundalen and Dyresrov (1992) interviewed 214 children of primary school age. **They found that two-thirds of the children did not even believing they would survive to become adults. They concluded that postwar Iraqi children were “the most traumatized children of war ever described.”** **Another study conducted by Geoff Simons (1996) on a sample of 2000 male and female children from 50 schools in Baghdad, found that the sanctions are affecting the children behavior and performances. The study found a number of startling increases in the children’s misbehaviors after the sanctions: anxiety among children rose from 22.2 percent to 49.4 percent; the desire to acquire and possess things (including theft) went from 20.9 percent to 48.8 percent; lying doubled, from 24.4 percent to 51.9 percent; aggressive behavior nearly doubled from 22.5 percent to 43.9 percent; falling asleep during studies from 18 percent to 33.7 percent; loss of confidence moved from 23.3 percent to 40.1 percent; difficulty in concentrating from 25.3 percent to 50.9 percent, and failure to do homework also doubled from 24 percent to 50.7 percent.** The above facts and figures are incompatible with all United Nations conventions. The human tragedy and economic deprivation caused by the economic sanctions contradict the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration called for preserving human life and dignity. Article I stated that “**All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood;” while Article 5 stated that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The condition of the Iraqi children is violating the Geneva Declaration of September 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights**. Article 25, paragraph 2 of the Declaration stated that “Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.” **The rights of Iraqi children are also violated according to 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.** The last covenants were adapted on December 16, 1966 and incorporated some of the fundamental rights of the child, such as the right to enjoy the highest standard of health and the right to enjoy the protection and care of their family and society as long as they are minors.

## Diplomatic sanctions result in a loss of critical intelligence information, harmed communication, an ability to respond to crisis situations, and harm economic sanctions effectiveness

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The Case Against Diplomatic Sanctions At first glance, diplomatic sanctions may appear to be a rather cost-free measure for the United States, as they do not require expenditures in terms of U.S. forces or dollars. **Diplomatic sanctions, however, can lead to: the loss of valuable intelligence** for the United States, **diminished U.S. communication with the target state, and a reduced ability to promote U.S. interests overseas.** **Diplomatic sanctions may also undermine the effectiveness of other measures designed to get the target state to comply** with U.S. demands. Loss of Information and Intelligence **Having an embassy in a country not only makes it easier to access information and track events within that country,** but also allows the United States to gain a perspective it might not otherwise have. **The duties of political officers include collecting and analyzing information about the attitudes and actions of foreign governments and societies.** U.S. **embassies report on human rights, economic trends, and future potential leadership, among other important subjects.** **While some argue that advances in telecommunications make an on-the-ground presence unnecessary, certain information cannot be gleaned without the special awareness fostered and developed by living and working in the target country**.16 According to Bruce Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, “The way the U.S. collects information about countries, having an embassy is absolutely critical. You need political staff that can go out on the street and talk to people, pick up the gossip.”17 Similarly, Professor Robert Wolfe writes: It might be cheaper to phone colleagues in other governments, sending in officials and ministers when needed, but the intangible assets that are a foreign ministry's stock in trade-knowing who is who in the government or the ability to interpret complex events-can only be developed and then exploited by being on the ground.18 **An on-the-ground presence also gives the U.S. government critical information that can greatly assist in crisis management, humanitarian disasters, and negotiations with the target government.** The most recent edition of the Department of State's Foreign Service Journal documents the integral role the U.S. embassy played after the earthquake in Haiti, in terms of both following events on the ground and assisting with relief efforts.19 **Diplomatic sanctions may make miscommunication or misperception more likely. Maintaining diplomatic sanctions, therefore, is bound to result in a dramatic loss of critical information, which is essential to crafting effective U.S. foreign policy**.**20 For example, without an embassy presence in Afghanistan, along with a general lack of attention paid to the country by successive administrations, U.S. officials were clearly lacking of information on the ground throughout the 1990s**. According to journalist Steve Coll, the CIA's legal authority to carry out covert actions in Afghanistan ended in January 1992. As a result, Coll writes in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Ghost Wars, the “CIA's Afghan operations atrophied to a shadow of [their] former strength.”21 Furthermore, not only did the United States not have a CIA station in Afghanistan once the embassy closed, but Afghanistan no longer remained a priority on the intelligence agenda.22 In addition, with no embassy in place, the United States could clearly not follow events on the ground in the same way as when it used to have an embassy.23 **The United States became increasingly reliant on information from third parties. For example, in a 1995 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad titled, “The Taliban: What We've Heard,” the Department of State reports on the dynamics in Kandahar and the activities of the Taliban solely based on meetings with UN and Western journalist sources who had recently returned from the area.**24 Similarly, Matthew Aid, an intelligence historian and former National Security Agency analyst, also notes that the lack of an embassy in Kabul undermined human intelligence collection. Aid argues that the CIA had to rely primarily on Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), for human intelligence since most U.S. intelligence was in the realm of signals intelligence. **Moreover, a 1996 congressional study of intelligence coverage of rogue states found that signals intelligence was the main source of information, with human intelligence being secondary.**25 **Signals intelligence, however, can be problematic because individuals can simply stop using email and phones to communicate, which makes intelligence collection of that kind increasingly difficult.** Aid also points out that a 1994 CIA assessment found that human intelligence was the most important form of intelligence to combat international terrorism.26 **These limitations on U.S. intelligence continue to complicate the pursuit of U.S. interests today**. The most recent example is that of Iran, where during the protests in the aftermath of the June 2009 Iranian election, the United States was faced with informational deficiencies due to a lack of diplomatic ties or an embassy presence in the country. According to the New York Times, the Obama administration had a difficult time understanding and addressing these protests due to limited information channels. **As a result, information on the crisis was obtained largely via Facebook, Twitter, and other less reliable, informal sources.27 Government officials and experts were concerned that these sources of information could not provide the United States with insight into the internal political dynamics between the Iranian leadership or the precise strength of the opposition movement in the country.**28 **Undermining Communication and Increasing Misperception In addition to information collection, one of the primary roles of an embassy is to serve as a conduit for communication between the sender and target state.29 Embassy officials constantly meet with both high-level members of the government and with citizens of their host country. Day-to-day communication is essential, not only to convey U.S. interests and understand host country concerns, but also to explain certain key U.S. decisions.** **Similarly, regular face-to-face communication in the target country also helps the sender state to forge relationships with people in the host state and develop these relationships over time.30 Diplomatic sanctions may hinder communication between the target and sender states, making miscommunication or misperception between the states more likely.** **Such sanctions create fewer formal channels of communication and contribute to increased resistance to other forms of state-to-state interaction in the name of isolation**. Not only is communication reduced, but states are also more likely to be dismissive or uncertain about the nature of messages conveyed through alternative communication channels or third parties. During the Korean conflict, for instance, U.S. uncertainty regarding the credibility of a message sent from China through a third-party ambassador may have influenced China's decision to enter the war. At the time, the United States and China did not have diplomatic relations. While Chinese preparations to intervene began prior to the U.S. crossing of the 38th parallel, the decision to intervene does not appear to have been fully finalized and implemented until after the Chinese perceived Soviet support to be secured and the Americans actually crossed the 38th parallel.31 The Chinese even issued a warning after an emergency meeting on October 2, 1950, stating, “The American forces are endeavoring to cross the 38th parallel and aim to expand the war. If they really want to do so, we will not sit still and do nothing. We will surely respond. Please inform your prime minister of this position.” 32 Diplomatic sanctions detract from U.S. public diplomacy to the target state's people. The warning, however, was issued through an Indian diplomat, who served as the third-party communicator between China and the United States. According to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the reports from the Indians were consistent on this issue, but were not taken to be completely credible as the United States thought that Ambassador Kavalam Pannikar of India, who conveyed the message, was not the most reliable messenger.33 The United States viewed Pannikar as a biased messenger and distrusted him due to his “leftist” political beliefs. David Halberstam writes that Acheson “viewed Pannikar as a mouthpiece for Beijing and not a serious diplomat.”34 More recently, the lack of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States contributed to another situation in which a message was passed through a third party from the Iranians to the United States and ultimately ignored. In May 2003, the Foreign Ministry of Iran sent a fax to the Swiss ambassador in Tehran proposing a “grand bargain” between Iran and the United States. The document addressed terrorism, Iran's nuclear program, and Israel, calling for direct talks in addition to U.S.-Iran working groups on disarmament, regional security, and economic cooperation.35 According to multiple sources, the United States neither responded to the fax nor seriously considered the proposal.36 While it is unclear whether Iran and the United States could have made progress on any of the issues had the proposal been addressed, the diplomatic climate combined with the U.S. policy of isolating the regime took even considering the proposal off the table**. Reduced Ability to Promote U.S. Interests Embassies and ambassadors also serve to promote the sender country's interests abroad while influencing the target state, serving as a conduit for aid and assisting in bilateral relations.**37 Part of the role of embassy staff is to project a positive U.S. image to both the host government and the population through direct contact and public diplomacy campaigns. Embassies, for example, may play a role in explaining the U.S. position on a particular issue, and may even persuade key officials not to oppose U.S. policies by calling attention to the potential adverse consequences of such opposition. Ambassadors can also help to ameliorate potential conflicts by being able to promptly influence events on the ground in the target country.38 For example, in 1933, U.S. ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels, played a key role in mitigating a potential crisis in diplomatic relations following Mexico's nationalization of the foreign-owned oil industry, by moderating the U.S. response and conveying U.S. positions to Mexico. According to Professor Yoav Tenembaum, the Mexican undersecretary for foreign affairs attributed the maintenance of U.S.–Mexico diplomatic ties to the crucial role of the ambassador.39 Embassy officials may also play a role in lobbying other segments of the target country's population to support measures that are favorable to U.S. interests or conveying the U.S. message to the media.40 **Diplomatic sanctions may weaken knowledge of a target state's economic vulnerabilities. Diplomatic sanctions also detract from the United States' ability to engage beyond the government, in public diplomacy to influence perceptions on the ground in target states. Closing an embassy and the consequent disengagement with a country cuts off one very substantial official avenue for the United States to promote its image abroad and work to shape the opinions of both leaders and the public in a target state.** The lack of a diplomatic presence in a country makes it difficult for the United States to give the host country a sense of Washington's thinking on various issues, which may increase the likelihood of further disagreements between the two states in the future. Reduce Economic Sanctions' Effectiveness **Diplomatic sanctions may also undermine the effectiveness of other coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, in at least two ways. First, in order for the United States to craft effective economic sanctions, it needs knowledge of specific target state vulnerabilities.41 To the extent that a lack of diplomatic presence in the target state reduces U.S. capacity for information gathering, the United States is less able to identify target state vulnerabilities and hence to craft precisely targeted “smart” economic sanctions**. **Second, the absence of U.S. personnel on the ground makes tracking the effectiveness of economic sanctions over time more challenging. This decreased ability to understand the consequences of sanctions in real time makes it more difficult to alter these sanctions based on which elements of the sanctions policy succeed and which do not**. Similarly, the purpose of economic sanctions can be better explained to the population, so that the target country does not have a monopoly on conveying information about why sanctions have been imposed. **A diplomatic presence also allows officials to clearly convey the conditions that need to be met for sanctions to be removed, while monitoring small and gradual shifts in behavior. Diplomatic sanctions may make it increasingly difficult for the sender state to clearly articulate its threats and to track the impact of various warnings and punishments on the target government or population. These are not just theoretical problems. A preliminary analysis of the well-known Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott economic sanctions dataset, along with newly-collected data on diplomatic sanctions by the author, lends support to these claims.** The dataset records 126 U.S. economic sanctions episodes from 1947 through 2002 (seven of these are only economic sanctions threats, where economic sanctions are never actually imposed). The dataset codes 52 percent of these cases as having a positive or successful policy outcome, in which the target state complied with the U.S. policy demand. **When looking at the subset of economic sanctions episodes in which any diplomatic sanctions were also employed, however, the success rate drops to 41 percent. When examining the cases in which high-level diplomatic sanctions (e.g., closing an embassy) were used, the success rate drops even lower, to 34 percent**. While these figures only provide a rough sketch of the data, and do not control for a number of other variables or address potential selection effects, the findings are suggestive. **Additional statistical analysis conducted by the author also reveals that, when controlling for a number of economic and political variables, which have been shown in previous studies to affect Sanctions' success, the higher the level of diplomatic sanction employed in an economic sanctions episode, the more likely the United States will fail to get the target state to comply with its demands**.42 Furthermore, additional analysis indicates that the substantive effect of varying the level of diplomatic sanctions from no diplomatic sanctions to closing an embassy, while holding all other variables in the model constant at their means, increases the probability of Sanctions' failure from 42 to 73 percent, while the probability of success drops from 58 to 27 percent.

## Intervention can be used to stop human rights abuses and prevent individuals from becoming refugees

Ryan **Vetticad 20**, University of Illinois, “The Justification of International Military Intervention in Response to Human Rights Abuses”, Fall 2020, Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security, Volume VII, <https://ugresearchjournals.illinois.edu/index.php/IJOIS/article/view/704/627>

**This further leads to the two case studies of the Rwandan and Armenian genocides.** And specifically these were not merely factual accounts of both events but rather more nuanced approaches to both affairs. In the case of Rwanda, through the perspective of the West and international community, and the lessons that can be learned from the incident. In the case of Armenia, with the overtone of the theme of altruism and how that motif fits into the overall picture. Both Scheffer and Hovannisian assert the position that there are numerous undertones that go along with both of these events. **In the case of Rwanda, the international community made multiple mistakes and as a result, one of the greatest atrocities of the 21st century occurred. In the case of Armenia, although the international community did not necessarily have the ability to intervene due to the circumstances of the situation** (the First World War), **there were still individuals and communities that took the responsibility to intervene even while the events of the genocide unfolded. What both of these sources work to provide is that it is both the responsibility of the international community and system to intervene when human rights violations like this occur, and in addition, it is in our human nature to help those who need it even in the most dire of circumstances. As a result it is more than justifiable to engage in military intervention, as it is both our civic duty as well as in our human nature.** In addition to these two case studies, it is vital to incorporate the topic of how these human rights abuses and international conflicts have affected people in the scope of their actual livelihood. The main avenue to explore that dynamic is in reference to the refugee crisis that currently exists in many wartorn countries that both have and have not experienced international military intervention. The table above comes directly from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and showcases the amount of refugees that various regions of the world currently have. However, going a step further, the table below showcases that pertaining data and explores exactly which countries have the highest number of refugees. **At closer inspection and comparison between these two tables, one can easily see that Syria (6.7 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), South Sudan (2.3 million), Myanmar (1.1 million), and Somalia (0.9 million), just five countries house more than two-thirds or 67% of all refugees worldwide. The reason why this information is vital, especially when analyzing which specific countries have the most refugees, is because when one compares that data to the international military intervention that particular nation has seen it showcases how conflict has impacted the lives of that nation's people in regards to their human rights.** When you look at nations such as Myanmar (which was discussed earlier) and South Sudan, it becomes known that there is not an immense degree of international military intervention if any at all. In turn that reflects the immense amount of refugees from those states. **Yet, if there was international military intervention perhaps those numbers would be smaller and fewer people would have been displaced. This only works to prove the fact that if there were international military intervention, then the amount of refugees from these countries could be lower and this only works to justify the fact that international military intervention is not only vital in stopping human rights abuses but is justified by them.** Building off of this point, the last theme to discuss is the concept of R2P as a whole. Colonel Raymond’s report on the concepts of both the Responsibility to Protect as well as the Responsibility while Protecting, works to encapsulate this entire argument**. One can already see that it is both an aspect of civic duty as well as in our human nature to intervene when there are violations of human rights, and this whole concept of R2P is that very idea codified.** Evans showcased the dynamic that exists on the other side of the aisle, bringing to light some of the fundamental flaws that exist within the R2P protocol. Yet even with these flaws, one can see that R2P is generally a successful and prominent approach when it comes to military intervention in the international system, and Rabar’s report works to bring the whole argument together. That even though R2P is nowhere near perfect, it is by far the best approach the international system possesses, and fully works to the benefit of both the country receiving as well as the country giving help. This only works to support the notion that international military intervention is fully justified when it comes to human rights abuses. The R2P concept as a whole is an ‘imperfect’ approach towards working and solving the issues of international conflict, specifically in regards to human rights.

## Peace keeping missions are key to maintaining ceasefires

Conan & Goldstein 2011, Neal Conan of NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Joshua Goldstein author of Wining the War on War, 12/7/11, “War and Violence on the Decline in Modern Times”, NPR Talk of the Nation, <https://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143285836/war-and-violence-on-the-decline-in-modern-times>

GOLDSTEIN: Yes, way more effective than people credit**. I think there are three big reasons for the decline of war in the international system**, one of which is this shift of norms that Steven Pinker has referred to. Things like dueling or human sacrifice just aren't cool anymore. The second is the rise of prosperity and interdependence so that you don't get rich by conquering territory anymore, you get rich by trade, and war doesn't work for that. But **the third, which I focus on primarily, is the rise of the United Nations and peacekeeping,** **which has given the international community a way to manage and reduce conflicts, not to bring about world peace in one big gulp but to go into war zones where formerly ceasefires would break down more than half of the time. But now most of them stick. Ninety percent stick because peacekeepers are able to provide that security.** Now, this has been a very - as we all know, a challenging job for the United Nations and one that hasn't always been successful. But over the last decades, **the U.N. has gotten better at peacekeeping, has gotten more effective at peacekeeping, and it's really cheap.** So the average American household pays $700 every month for our military and veterans' benefits, but $2 a month for peacekeeping, so $2 versus $700, and it gets us things that our military can't get us, not to say it can do everything the military does, but $2. So we could be beefing this up a little bit, and **it's quite cost-effective.**